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A NEW GENERATION OF CLASS ACTION CY PRES 
REMEDIES: LESSONS FROM WASHINGTON STATE 
Cecily C. Shiel 
Abstract: The use of cy pres as a mechanism to distribute residual funds in class actions 
has become increasingly common and the subject of much controversy. In the class action 
context, cy pres is an equitable remedy used by courts to appropriate class action settlement 
funds remaining after all identified class parties have been compensated to the funds’ “next 
best use,” usually to a charity. The controversy has stemmed primarily from a lack of clear 
judicially enforced standards on how and when to use cy pres. In light of recent controversy, 
both the Federal Rules Committee, and potentially the Supreme Court, are now considering 
stepping-in to consider changes to the doctrine. While most of the debate has focused on the 
federal courts, some states have been codifying their own approaches to provide structure and 
guidance to courts in the use of cy pres. In 2006, Washington State passed a groundbreaking 
amendment to Civil Rule 23, requiring that at least twenty-five percent of residual class 
action funds go the Legal Foundation of Washington, a charity providing legal aid services to 
indigent persons in the State of Washington. This rule is representative of a larger state trend 
towards adopting statutory approaches to cy pres that promote legal aid charities as 
appropriate cy pres recipients. Focusing primarily but not exclusively on Washington, this 
Comment argues that states have been effective “laboratories of innovation” in reaching 
workable solutions to the residual funds dilemma in consumer class actions. These codified 
state approaches to cy pres have shown to be effective methods for selecting and approving 
cy pres awards that provide for appropriate relief while curbing improper incentives and bias 
in the cy pres selection process. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, AT&T agreed to pay $45 million to settle a class action 
lawsuit in Washington State.1 The class action lawsuit alleged that 
AT&T failed to disclose call rates on collect calls placed by inmates in 
Washington State Department of Correction facilities.2 The rate 
1. Settlement Agreement at app. 1, Judd v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (King 
Cnty. Super. Ct., Wash. Jan. 22, 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
565824-appendix-1-cr2a-agreement-with-att.html; Matt Clarke, Historic $45 Million Settlement in 
Washington State Prison Phone Class-Action Suit, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 2013, at 26; 
Jonathan Martin, Op-ed, AT&T to Pay Washington Prisoners’ Families $45 Million in Telephone 
Class Action Settlement, SEATTLE TIMES–OPINION NORTHWEST (Feb. 3, 2013), 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/opinionnw/2013/02/03/att-to-pay-washington-prisoners-families-45-
million-in-telephone-class-action-settlement/. 
2. Complaint – Class Action at 2, Judd v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (King 
Cnty. Super. Ct., Wash. June 29, 2000).  
943 
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disclosure was required by law under Washington’s Consumer 
Protection Statute, RCW Chapter 19.86.3 The harms from AT&T’s 
disclosure violations were accentuated by the fact that the rates for 
prison collect calls were quite high.4 During the relevant time period, 
intrastate collect call rates from prisons in Washington State included a 
$3.95 flat fee plus additional charges of $0.90 per minute, thus making a 
twenty-minute phone call $21.95.5 The only way for inmates to make 
phone calls to family members and loved ones was by making these 
collect calls, and without disclosure of the associated charges, some 
recipients of these calls racked up more than $10,000 in collect call 
charges.6 After years of bouncing back and forth between hearings 
before the Washington Utilities Commission, King County Superior 
Court, the Washington State Supreme Court, and back to superior court, 
the settlement brought to an end twelve years of litigation.7 The 
settlement class was certified to include all persons who received a 
collect call from an inmate in a qualifying Washington State Department 
of Corrections facility between 1996 and 2000.8 At the time of 
settlement, it was anticipated that between 70,000 and 172,000 
individuals would be eligible for refunds from the settlement fund.9 
The AT&T settlement illustrates a common problem encountered 
when resolving class actions. With such an expansive plaintiff class, and 
given the length of time over which the litigation took place, it would be 
nearly impossible today to track down every individual who received a 
phone call from an inmate during the relevant period—now more than 
ten years ago—in order to give them the recovery to which they are 
entitled.10 Furthermore, the damages suffered by each individual class 
member were, on average, relatively minor. Each class member’s 
3. Id. at 5. 
4. Class Counsel’s Recommendations for Additional Cy Pres Awards, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 
SEA (Mar. 26, 2014); Clarke, supra note 1, at 26. 
5. Clarke, supra note 1, at 26.  
6. Id. 
7. Martin, supra note 1. 
8. Complaint – Class Action, supra note 2, at 2. 
9. Martin, supra note 1.  
10. The length of time over which litigation occurred is often a factor affecting whether or not 
class members can be located for purposes of distributing settlement funds. See, e.g., In re 
Paracelsus Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A. H-96-3464, 2007 WL 433281, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 
2007) (approving cy pres award in 2007 for residual funds remaining from class action settlement 
reached in 1999, because “[t]he record establishes that at this late date, it would not be feasible 
either to locate the class members who did not receive or cash the settlement checks when they were 
mailed or to allocate the undistributed amount to the individual class members who could be located 
years ago but whose present whereabouts may well be different”). 
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recovery consisted only of the cost of all qualified collect calls accepted 
during the relevant time period, plus two hundred dollars in statutory 
damages.11 Thus, the money spent tracking down potentially qualifying 
plaintiffs would eat away at, or perhaps entirely consume, the already 
small recovery. Complete distribution in this case was expected to be 
both administratively and financially infeasible. In fact, the parties 
anticipated at the time of settlement that nearly $20 million of the 
settlement amount would remain in uncollected residual funds.12 What 
should be done with the money that cannot be distributed? The solution: 
Distribute the remaining funds through cy pres. 
Cy pres, which means “as near as possible,” is an equitable remedy 
that courts use to disburse class action settlement funds remaining after 
all identified class parties have been compensated, to the funds’ “next 
best use,” usually to a charity.13 However, the use of cy pres as a 
mechanism to distribute residual funds in class action suits has been the 
subject of much controversy. The controversy stems from the fact that cy 
pres has been characterized by a surprising lack of judicially enforced 
standards. Without clear limits on when and how to use cy pres, it is 
feared that the appropriation of class funds to charitable recipients will 
become an instrument of abuse by self-interested judges and attorneys.14 
Cy pres distributions have been criticized for going to unrelated causes 
or causes with suspicious ties to attorneys and judges.15 Others criticize 
cy pres for spurring inappropriate charitable lobbying, as needy, albeit 
worthy, charitable causes have begun soliciting parties and courts for cy 
pres awards.16 Some commentators question whether the use of this 
11. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, at app. 2. 
12. Notice of Cy Pres Hearing in Judd v. AT&T, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N—NWSIDEBAR (July 
3, 2013), http://nwsidebar.wsba.org/2013/07/03/judd-att-cy-pres-hearing/. 
13. 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:32 (5th ed. 2011); see also 
Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A 
Normative & Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 620 (2010) (noting that in recent times, “the 
term cy pres has generally referred to an effort to provide unclaimed compensatory funds to a 
charitable interest that is in some way related to either the subject of the case or the interests of the 
victims, broadly defined”). 
14. See Jennifer Johnston, Note, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is Possible: How Cy Pres 
Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J.L. ECON & POL’Y 277, 290 (2013). 
15. See infra Part II.C. 
16. Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributions in Class Action Settlements, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1014, 1027–28 (2009); Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26bar.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print 
(noting that former federal Judge David F. Levi was solicited by groups for cy pres funds); see also 
infra Part II.C. 
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doctrine is ever appropriate.17 
The controversy over cy pres recently boiled over in response to a 
widely publicized class action settlement in Lane v. Facebook, Inc.18 
The case was a class action against Facebook for privacy violations as a 
result of Facebook’s Beacon program.19 The Beacon program operated 
by updating a Facebook user’s online profile automatically with 
information about the user’s activities on other participating websites—
displaying such items as movie rentals from Blockbuster.com and online 
purchases from Overstock.com.20 Facebook made it difficult for users to 
avoid the public broadcasting of their online activities by requiring users 
to affirmatively opt out of the program if they wanted to avoid these 
disclosures.21 
The lawyers for the parties reached a settlement agreement for 
$9.5 million, and in lieu of any individual payments to class members, 
the settlement earmarked $6.5 million of the funds for cy pres 
distribution.22 The cy pres award was to go to a newly created charity 
called the Digital Trust Foundation. Notably, a former Facebook 
executive was to serve on the three-person board of the Foundation, and 
the Foundation had no track record upon which to evaluate its 
legitimacy.23 Media erupted with cries of foul play.24 Not without 
controversy, the settlement was approved by the district court,25 and 
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in a two-to-one vote26 with Judge 
17. Liptak, supra note 16 (quoting Professor Samuel Issacharoff as saying, “I don’t care how 
much good you want to do. Do it with your own money, not someone else’s money”). Some 
commentators have even challenged cy pres on constitutional grounds. See generally Redish et al., 
supra note 13. 
18. 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub 
nom. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). 
19. Id. at 816. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 827 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting that Facebook required users to affirmatively opt 
out of the Beacon program, and describing the “video game skills” needed to notice and effectuate 
the opt out). 
22. Id. at 816, 817 (majority opinion). 
23. Id. at 829 (Kleinfield, J., dissenting). 
24. Glenn G. Lammi, Ninth Circuit Decision and Dissenters Cry out for SCOTUS Review on Cy 
Pres in Settlements, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/ 
02/28/ninth-circuit-decision-and-dissenters-cry-out-for-scotus-review-on-cy-pres-in-settlements/; 
Adam Liptak, When Lawyers Cut Their Clients out of the Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/supreme-court-may-hear-novel-class-action-case.html. 
25. Facebook, 696 F.3d 811. 
26. Id. 
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Kleinfield dissenting.27 A petition for rehearing en banc was denied over 
the dissent of six judges.28 In both decisions, the dissents sharply 
criticized the cy pres award and questioned the incentives behind 
Facebook and the lawyers who structured it.29 It is easy to see why: With 
the settlement, Facebook purchased a release of all liability for claims 
from millions of affected consumers, without attempting to provide 
individual compensation, and while effectuating a charitable donation 
over which they retained significant control of the charity’s objectives. 
The settlement approval was appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, which denied certiorari.30 In a statement accompanying the denial 
of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts supported the Court’s decision not to 
review the case because he felt the Facebook case would likely not have 
provided the Court with the opportunity to answer the “fundamental 
concerns” surrounding cy pres remedies, “including when, if ever, such 
relief should be considered.”31 “Citing a law review article that criticized 
[cy pres] settlements . . . [Chief Justice Roberts] posed six questions, 
ending with ‘and so on,’ which implied that there was quite a bit more 
that he wanted to know.”32 It is clear that at least some members of the 
Supreme Court are looking skeptically at the class action cy pres 
remedy, and are poised and ready for the “right” case to weigh in on cy 
pres.33 
27. Id. at 826, 835 (Kleinfield, J., dissenting) (“The majority approves ratification of a class 
action settlement in which class members get no compensation at all. They do not get one cent. 
They do not get even an injunction against Facebook doing exactly the same thing to them again. 
Their purported lawyers get millions of dollars. Facebook gets a bar against any claims any of them 
might make for breach of their privacy rights. The most we could say for the cy pres award is that in 
exchange for giving up any claims they may have, the exposed Facebook users get the satisfaction 
of contributing to a charity to be funded by Facebook, partially controlled by Facebook, and advised 
by a legal team consisting of Facebook’s counsel and their own purported counsel whom they did 
not hire and have never met.”). 
28. Facebook, 709 F.3d at 793 (M. Smith, Circuit Judge, with whom Kozinski, Chief Judge, and 
O’Scannlain, Bybee, Bea, and Ikuta, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
29. Facebook, 696 F.3d at 834 (Kleinfield, J., dissenting) (“A defendant may prefer a cy pres 
award to a damages award, for the public relations benefit. And the larger the cy pres award, the 
easier it is to justify a larger attorneys’ fees award. The incentive for collusion may be even greater 
where, as here, there is nothing to stop Facebook and class counsel from managing the charity to 
serve their interests and pay salaries and consulting fees to persons they choose.”). 
30. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). 
31. Id. at *4; see also Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Bring Me a Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/opinion/bring-me-a-case.html; Jessie Kokrda Kamens, 
Supreme Court Won’t Review Facebook Pact, But Chief Justice Shares Cy Pres ‘Concerns,’ 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bna.com/supreme-court-wont-n17179880036/.  
32. Greenhouse, supra note 31. 
33. Id. 
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But while most of the debate about when and how to use cy pres 
remedies has focused on the federal class action arena, states have been 
finding their own innovative ways of dealing with the residual funds 
dilemma. In 2006, Washington State became one of the first states to 
expressly codify cy pres as the preferred method for distributing residual 
class action funds by amending Washington’s Civil Rule 23(f).34 
Washington’s Civil Rule 23(f) requires that at least twenty-five percent 
of all residual class action funds be distributed to the Legal Foundation 
of Washington, the legal aid fund that administers Washington State’s 
Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Accounts (IOLTA)35 program and provides 
civil legal aid to low-income individuals in Washington State.36 Using 
Rule 23(f) as a framework, Washington State Superior Court Judge Beth 
Andrus in the Judd v. AT&T case used cy pres to distribute the large 
amount of residual funds left from the AT&T prison rate disclosure 
settlement.37 In selecting cy pres recipients, the court solicited cy pres 
proposals and held extensive hearings.38 Ultimately, Judge Andrus 
approved a significant cy pres award to the Legal Foundation of 
Washington to administer a grant program for a list of charities the judge 
certified as appropriate cy pres recipients.39 
While Washington was one of the first states to codify an approach to 
cy pres, other states have followed in recent years and adopted similar 
34. Andrea D. Axel & David A. Leen, Unclaimed Class Action Funds Offer Hope for Equal 
Justice, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, July 2007, at 24, 24; see also WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Additions or 
amendments to court rules in the State of Washington are promulgated by the Washington State 
Supreme Court. See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 9. 
35. Washington’s IOLTA program mandates that “[a]ll client funds paid to any Washington 
lawyer or law firm must be deposited in identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts separate from 
any accounts containing non-trust money of the lawyer or law firm.” Brown v. Legal Found. of 
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 224 (2003). In Washington State, the IOLTA program was established by the 
Washington State Supreme Court under its authority to regulate the practice of law and is 
mandatory for all Washington lawyers. Id. at 223. “The State of Washington, like every other State 
in the Union, uses interest on lawyers’ trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services provided to 
the needy.” Id. at 220. “The Legal Foundation of Washington (Legal Foundation) was established 
by Order of the Supreme Court of Washington to administer distribution of Interest on Lawyer’s 
Trust Account (IOLTA) funds to civil legal aid programs.” 2 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON 
PRACTICE SERIES, RULES PRACTICE, ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYER CONDUCT § 15.7(a) (8th ed.). 
36. WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f); Inside LFW, LEGAL FOUND. WASH., http://www.legalfoundation.org/ 
pages/inside_lfw (last visited May 31, 2015). 
37. See Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations, Judd v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (King Cnty. Super. Ct., Wash. 
Sept. 25, 2013).  
38. Order Setting Hearing Schedule to Consider Requests for Cy Pres Awards, Judd, No. 00-2-
17565-5 SEA (June 26, 2013). 
39. Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
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measures.40 The resulting trend in the states that have addressed cy pres 
has been towards recognizing legal aid charities as legitimate recipients 
of cy pres funds, while typically still allowing courts discretion in 
disbursing a portion of the residual funds. 
Focusing primarily but not exclusively on Washington, this Comment 
argues that states have been effective “laboratories of innovation”41 in 
reaching workable solutions to the residual funds dilemma in consumer 
class actions. This Comment examines various approaches to cy pres 
adopted and codified by states such as Washington, and notes several 
trends that have emerged among these codifications. This Comment 
argues that these state approaches have shown promise as effective 
methods for selecting and approving cy pres awards that provide for 
appropriate relief while curbing improper incentives and bias in the cy 
pres selection process. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the origins of the cy pres doctrine. 
Part II examines the uneven application of cy pres in federal courts and 
the controversy it has engendered. Part III examines states’ approaches 
to cy pres awards, and in particular, Washington State’s approach. This 
Comment explores the AT&T settlement in depth as a mechanism for 
evaluating the application of Washington Civil Rule 23(f) in practice. 
In Part IV, this Comment discusses alternatives to cy pres, and 
concludes that cy pres is the best solution to the residual funds dilemma. 
In Part V, this Comment argues that the main critiques of the cy pres 
doctrine stem from improper uses of the doctrine, not from inherent 
flaws in the doctrine itself, and as seen from state codifications of cy 
pres, that the doctrine can be constrained and applied in ways that 
provide actual and appropriate judicial relief. This Comment further 
suggests that the legal fiction implicit in cy pres has been misconstrued 
and argues that legal aid charities can qualify as appropriate cy pres 
recipients. Cy pres provides an important mechanism for access to 
justice and if applied with sufficient structural safeguards and standards, 
it can provide meaningful and proper relief. 
40. As of May 2015, sixteen states have adopted statutes or civil rules allowing for cy pres 
remedies in class actions. 
41. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, states have an interest in “serv[ing] as 
laboratories for innovation and experiment.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF CY PRES AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN CLASS ACTIONS 
A. The Origins and Meaning of Cy Pres 
Cy pres originally developed as an equitable doctrine in trust law to 
preserve charitable trusts whose original purpose had become 
frustrated.42 The term “cy pres” comes from the phrase “cy pres comme 
possible,” which is a French expression meaning “as near as possible.”43 
Under this doctrine, when a charitable trust became impracticable or 
impossible to fulfill, for example if the original charitable recipient 
ceased to exist, courts could exercise their broad equitable powers to 
restructure the trust to distribute the funds to an entity that most nearly 
carried out the original testator’s intent.44 In order for courts to apply the 
cy pres doctrine to enforce a trust, the court must find: (1) that the gift 
constitutes a valid charitable trust; (2) that the gift has become 
impracticable or impossible to fulfill; and (3) that the testator, in 
effectuating the gift, expressed a general charitable intent.45 
Cy pres in the class action concept differs slightly from its trust law 
origins. Class action cy pres is applied to distribute funds from class 
action settlement or awards to their next best use when direct 
distribution to class members has become impracticable or impossible.46 
This occurs in two primary situations. First, it has been used when all 
absent class plaintiffs that can be identified have been compensated, but 
residual funds remain for those absent class members who cannot be 
identified—or have been identified but have failed to cash their 
checks—rendering further distribution of funds to individual class 
members impossible.47 Second, it has been used when the administrative 
costs of distributing the funds to individual class members outweighs the 
value of the individual awards, and would thereby consume the entirety 
of the fund, rendering individual distributions impracticable.48 In these 
situations, courts have borrowed the “as near as possible” concept from 
42. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 624. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. For further discussion on the origins and function of cy pres in trust law, see id. at 624–30.  
45. Id. at 629. 
46. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); Johnston, 
supra note 14, at 282. 
47. Johnston, supra note 14, at 282–83. 
48. Id. 
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charitable trust cy pres to put the class funds to their “next best use.”49 
The use of cy pres remedies in the class action context can be traced 
to an influential student comment written in the early 1970s50 suggesting 
that unclaimed class action funds could be used to indirectly benefit the 
class members.51 Today, the doctrine is used to appropriate class action 
settlement funds to charitable organizations, ideally those with ties to the 
underlying merits of the lawsuit.52 “In a class action the reason for a 
remedy modeled on cy pres is to prevent the defendant from walking 
away from the litigation scot-free because of the infeasibility of 
distributing the proceeds of the settlement . . . .”53 
B. Standards for Applying Cy Pres in Class Action Suits 
Unlike trust law cy pres, class action cy pres has been characterized 
by a surprising lack of judicially enforced standards.54 The current 
system has been criticized for being “ad hoc, unpredictable, and 
49. Yospe, supra note 16, at 1017. 
50. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 631–32. 
51. Stewart Shepherd, Note, Damage Distributions in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 448, 464 (1972). 
52. This Comment uses the term “cy pres” to refer to the judicial practice of providing residual 
class action funds to a charitable organization that is tied in some way to the interests of the 
individual class members. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675 (2013); Redish 
et al., supra note 13, at 620 (“In more recent times . . . the term cy pres has generally referred to an 
effort to provide unclaimed compensatory funds to a charitable interest that is in some way related 
to either the subject of the case or the interests of the victims, broadly defined.”). Some courts have 
occasionally used the terms “cy pres” and “fluid class recovery” interchangeably. 4 RUBENSTEIN, 
supra note 13, at § 12:32; Redish et al., supra note 13, at 620. However, “fluid class recovery,” as 
used in this Comment, “refers to efforts to fashion relief to those who will be impacted by the 
defendant in the future, in an effort to roughly approximate the category of those who were injured 
in the past.” Redish et al., supra note 13, at 620. This Comment treats cy pres and fluid class 
recovery as distinct terms. See 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 13, § 13:32 (“Courts and commentators 
often use the term “cy pres” and “fluid recovery” interchangeably, although as discussed elsewhere 
in the Treatise, the two concepts are distinct. Cy pres directs unclaimed funds to a charity; fluid 
recovery directs all or most of a fund to a group of individuals more or less similarly situated to the 
class members themselves. The classic fluid recovery case involved a taxi company overcharging 
customers, with the remedy being that the taxi company would prospectively undercharge 
customers in an equal amount; those benefiting from the undercharge were not precisely the same 
class as those who suffered from the overcharge—but they were close enough. The beneficiaries 
were not, however, a charity, as is a cy pres recipient.”). 
53. Hughes, 731 F.3d at 676. 
54. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 13, at § 12:34 (“Appellate courts have balked when it appears that 
the recipients are too closely tied to the lawyers or court, but they have not used that occasion to set 
forth any clear guidelines for identification and selection of recipients.” (footnote omitted)); Goutam 
U. Jois, The Cy Pres Problem and the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
258, 259 (2008). 
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generally unprincipled.”55 The primary requirement under this doctrine 
is that there must be some connection—often called a “nexus”—between 
the interests of the class members and the proposed charitable recipient 
of the funds.56 By requiring a nexus between the proposed use of the 
funds and the interests of the class members the intent is to ensure that 
the class members will indirectly benefit from the funds and thus, the 
funds will go to their “next best use.”57 
Some courts, in deciding whether to approve a cy pres award, look to 
several factors to determine whether the nexus requirement has been 
met. “In applying cy pres principles, it is appropriate for a court to 
consider (1) the objectives of the underlying statutes, (2) the nature of 
the underlying suit, (3) the interests of the class members, and (4) the 
geographic scope of the case.”58 
Aside from the nexus requirement, courts have not uniformly adopted 
many clearly defined rules for how and when to grant cy pres awards.59 
The American Legal Institute (ALI) recently put forth principles for how 
and when cy pres should be used, and suggests courts not only look to 
the nexus of the proposed charitable recipient, but also to other factors in 
deciding whether to approve a cy pres award.60 The ALI’s principles are 
written not to codify the existing state of the law, but to suggest best 
practices and make recommendations for change and reform.61 Courts 
are in practice increasingly looking to these principles for guidance 
when awarding cy pres remedies.62 The ALI proposed that a cy pres 
award is appropriate only if it is impossible or infeasible to distribute the 
55. Jois, supra note 54, at 259. 
56. 4 RUBENSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 13, at § 12:33 n.3 (noting that a nexus requirement, or 
something similar, has been required in courts in the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits); see also Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012). 
57. Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865. 
58. Diamond Chem. Co. v. Azko Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220 (D.D.C. 2007). 
59. 4 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at § 12:34 (“Appellate courts have balked when it 
appears that the recipients are too closely tied to the lawyers or court, but they have not used that 
occasion to set forth any clear guidelines for identification and selection of recipients.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
60. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010) 
[hereinafter ALI’S PRINCIPLES]. 
61. See The American Law Institute’s New Principles of Aggregate Litigation, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 183, 189 (2011) (statement of Sam Issacharoff); Overview: Projects, ALI, 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instituteprojects (last visited May 31, 2015).  
62. Karen Shanley, The Institute in the Courts: Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, 34 
THE ALI REP., no. 4, summer 2012, available at http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter/summer2012/ 
07-institute-courts-aggregate-litigation.html. 
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funds to class members.63 “If individual class members can be identified 
through reasonable effort, and the distributions are sufficiently large to 
make individual distributions economically viable, settlement proceeds 
should be distributed directly to individual class members.”64 The 
inquiry into whether a distribution is infeasible must be based primarily 
on whether “the amounts involved are too small to make individual 
distributions economically viable.”65 Courts have increasingly looked to 
these principles,66 and have struck down proposed cy pres awards where 
counsel has failed to show that compensating class members directly 
was not possible or economically practical.67 
II. CY PRES APPLIED TO CLASS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL 
COURT 
Federal courts have struggled to apply the cy pres doctrine uniformly. 
The nexus requirement has been enforced in varying degrees by different 
courts, some even stating that it provides no restriction at all to the 
distribution of funds by the cy pres mechanism.68 Some courts have been 
more willing than others to strike down proposed cy pres distributions 
when they find the nexus requirement is lacking.69 The lack of a nexus 
between cy pres awards approved by courts and the underlying interests 
of the class members has been one of the primary criticisms of the 
doctrine in application.70 Many commenters have argued that without 
limits on judicial discretion and without a strong, “driving nexus” 
between the interests of the class and the proposed charitable recipient of 
63. ALI’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, at § 3.07. 
64. Id. § 3.07(a). 
65. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting ALI’S 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, § 3.07(a)). 
66. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing 
ALI’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, § 3.07 in reviewing cy pres award). 
67. See, e.g., id. at 1064–65 (striking down proposed cy pres award because class counsel failed 
to show that further distributions to class members were not feasible, adopting ALI’s Principles of 
Aggregate Litigation § 3.07); see also Shanley, supra note 62 (citing cases). 
68. See Jois, supra note 54, at 261; Yospe, supra note 16, at 1023 n.35. 
69. See Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Some courts appear to 
have abandoned the ‘next best use’ principle implicit in the cy pres doctrine. These courts have 
awarded cy pres distributions to myriad charities which, though no doubt pursuing virtuous goals, 
have little or nothing to do with the purposes of the underlying lawsuit or the class of plaintiffs 
involved.”); Yospe, supra note 16, at 1024–25. 
70. See, e.g., Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038 (“However, as a growing number of scholars and courts 
have observed, the cy pres doctrine—unbridled by a driving nexus between the plaintiff class and 
the cy pres beneficiaries—poses many nascent dangers to the fairness of the distribution process.”); 
Yospe, supra note 16, at 1023. 
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the funds, the doctrine creates improper incentives for judges, lawyers, 
and charities to distribute funds not for the benefit of the class members, 
but rather to further their own personal interests.71 
Many courts, wrestling with whether to approve particular cy pres 
distributions, have come to different conclusions about how closely 
related a charity must be to the interests of the class members in order to 
satisfy the nexus requirement.72 This Part briefly addresses two general 
approaches to the nexus requirement: first, that some courts apply the 
nexus requirement strictly as a firm limitation on the distribution of cy 
pres, and second, that some courts apply the nexus requirement more 
liberally. 
A. Some Federal Courts Have Implemented a Strict Interpretation of 
the Nexus Requirement 
Some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, have expressed a greater 
skepticism towards the use of cy pres awards for the disbursement of 
residual funds in class action settlements, and have been more willing to 
strike down proposed cy pres distributions when they stray far from the 
nexus requirement.73 The Ninth Circuit has developed guidelines for 
reviewing the appropriateness of cy pres proposals, and has repeatedly 
struck down cy pres proposals that fail to meet its guidelines.74 The 
Ninth Circuit has required that cy pres awards, in order to be 
appropriate, must “(1) address the objectives of the underlying statutes, 
(2) target the plaintiff class, [and] (3) provide reasonable certainty that 
any member will be benefitted.”75 
In Dennis v. Kellogg Co.,76 the Ninth Circuit struck down a proposed 
71. Johnston, supra note 14, at 278–79; Yospe, supra note 16, at 1027. 
72. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging 
disagreement among courts as to whether there must be an indirect benefit to the class members 
from the cy pres award). Compare Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (upholding a cy pres award to a legal aid organization, and acknowledging that the tie 
between the charity and the class members was weak), with Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 
865–68 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding proposed cy pres distribution to charities feeding the indigent was 
improper because the nexus requirement was not met). 
73. See, e.g., Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865–68. While this section focuses on cases from the Ninth 
Circuit, this more scrutinizing approach has also been applied in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re 
Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that distribution of 
unclaimed funds via cy pres did not meet the geographic scope of the class and was not tied to 
underlying substance of lawsuit and was therefore improper). 
74. See, e.g., Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865–68; Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040; Six (6) Mexican Workers 
v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990). 
75. Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040. 
76. 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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cy pres award for failing to satisfy the nexus requirement.77 The case 
was a class action suit against Kellogg, alleging the company’s 
advertising claims that Frosted Mini-Wheats cereal would improve 
children’s attentiveness nearly twenty percent were false and in violation 
of state consumer protection laws.78 The parties reached a settlement 
agreement, which established a claims fund where class members could 
submit claims and seek reimbursement for boxes of cereal purchased up 
to $15, and provided that any funds remaining after all claims were 
made would be distributed in a cy pres award to unspecified “charities 
that feed the indigent.”79 The Ninth Circuit struck down the proposed 
settlement agreement, holding that under the nexus requirement, an 
appropriate cy pres recipient would be an organization redressing 
injuries caused by false advertising, not a charity related generally to 
food.80 In doing so, the Court reiterated that in order for a cy pres 
distribution to be proper, there must be “a driving nexus between the 
plaintiff class and the cy pres beneficiaries.”81 The court also warned of 
the dangers that may result when the cy pres distribution is not tied to 
the interests of the class members, namely, that the cy pres distribution is 
likely to support the self-interests of the class counsel or the court.82 
In another Ninth Circuit class action, Nachshin v. AOL, LLC,83 the 
court similarly struck down a proposed cy pres distribution that was part 
of a class action settlement because the selected recipients, legal aid 
organizations in the Los Angeles area, failed to target the broad interests 
of the nationwide class.84 Other circuits have similarly rejected proposed 
cy pres distributions when finding the nexus requirement not strictly 
met.85 
77. Id. at 866–67. 
78. Id. at 862. 
79. Id. at 862–63. 
80. Id. at 867.  
81. Id. at 865 (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
82. Id. at 867.  
83. 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). 
84. Id. at 1041. 
85. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (adopting 
“reasonable approximation test” which requires cy pres recipient’s interests to “reasonably 
approximate those being pursued by the class” (quoting ALI’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, 
§ 3.07(c))); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(remanding for cy pres distribution more closely related to underlying merits of lawsuit).  
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B. Some Federal Courts Have Applied the Nexus Requirement 
Liberally 
While some courts have adhered to a strict interpretation of the nexus 
requirement, other courts have interpreted the cy pres doctrine’s 
requirements more liberally. A recent example of this method was 
articulated in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hughes v. Kore of 
Indiana Enterprise, Inc.86 In Hughes, Judge Posner stated that a lack of a 
nexus connecting the interests of the class members to the proposed cy 
pres recipient is not fatal to the approval of the cy pres award.87 “When 
there’s not even an indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s 
payment of damages, the cy pres remedy . . . is purely punitive. But we 
said in Mirfasihi that the punitive character of the remedy would not 
invalidate it.”88 
In Jones v. National Distillers,89 the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York approved a cy pres distribution of residual funds to 
the Legal Aid Society Civil Division, providing legal aid in civil 
matters.90 The underlying suit was a securities fraud class action.91 The 
court found that traditional cy pres principles were not instructive in this 
case because there was no obvious use of the funds that would provide a 
clear benefit to class members.92 The court upheld the cy pres award 
anyways, holding that 
[t]he absence of an obvious cause to support with the funds does 
not bar a charitable donation . . . . In recent years, the doctrine 
appears to have become more flexible . . . . While use of funds 
for purposes closely related to their origin is still the best cy pres 
application, the doctrine of cy pres and courts’ broad equitable 
powers now permit the use of funds for other public interest 
purposes by educational, charitable, and other public service 
organizations.93 
The court further justified the cy pres award by acknowledging there 
was at least a thin tie to the interest of class members because the legal 
86. 731 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2013).  
87. Id. at 676.  
88. Id. (citing Mirafasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
89. 56 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
90. Id. at 359. 
91. Id. at 358. 
92. Id.  
93. Id. at 359. 
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aid organization was assisting individuals with civil legal matters.94 In 
approving this particular cy pres award as appropriate, the court 
acknowledged that nonprofit legal services are appropriate cy pres 
recipients when the interests of class members are difficult to target with 
a particular organization.95 In Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc.,96 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois used similar 
reasoning to uphold cy pres distributions to fourteen organizations, 
including legal aid organizations and law school programs.97 
Most courts seem to agree that some tenable connection to the merits 
of the underlying class action, or to the interests of the class members 
generally, must be present in order to approve a cy pres award. 
However, courts lack clear standards for how close a charitable cause 
must be or how to determine when a charitable cause becomes too 
attenuated from the merits of the suit. As a result of the wide discretion 
courts have in policing these connections, approved cy pres awards span 
a range of causes with varying degrees of connection to the underlying 
class action. The lack of uniformity in the system for selecting and 
approving these awards has left cy pres doctrine vulnerable to attack and 
fostered ripe grounds for criticism and controversy. 
C. Criticism of Class Action Cy Pres Awards 
Without effective restraints on judicial discretion, and without 
uniform adherence to guiding principles on its use, scholars—and even 
some courts—have heavily critiqued cy pres. These attacks focus on 
questionable cy pres awards to identify two types of issues with the use 
of cy pres: first, the improper structural incentives cy pres distributions 
create,98 and second, the potential conflicts of interest involved in 
nominating and approving charitable recipients.99 
1. Improper Structural Incentives and Cy Pres Awards 
One common argument made by the opponents of cy pres is that it 
alters the structure of incentives for class counsel in ways that may be 
harmful for the class. These scholars argue that the doctrine improperly 
94. Id.  
95. Id. 
96. 827 F. Supp. 477, 480–87 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
97. Id. at 480–87.  
98. See, e.g., Yospe, supra note 16, at 1035. 
99. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 
117–24 (2014). 
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incentivizes plaintiffs’ attorneys to propose cy pres distributions rather 
than continue to attempt to give the money to yet unfound class 
members.100 Because courts include cy pres awards as part of the class 
recovery for purposes of calculating the amount of attorney’s fees, the 
attorneys will be paid whether the funds go to class members or to a 
third party through cy pres.101 The fear is, therefore, that attorneys will 
be “disincentiviz[ed] . . . in their efforts to assure the class-wide 
compensation of victims of the defendant’s unlawful behavior.”102 
One scholar who has advanced this argument, Martin Redish, notes 
that “in a quarter of cy pres class actions, the amount and recipient of the 
cy pres award was determined ex ante, or prior to giving absent class 
members the opportunity to make claims on the fund.”103 The concern is 
not only that attorneys will be disincentivized from tracking down class 
members, but that attorneys will use cy pres as a method to artificially 
“exaggerate” the settlement award for their own benefit.104 
In a recent decision the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held a cy pres 
distribution was inappropriate because the district court had not 
sufficiently considered whether the money could be used to further track 
down and compensate class members.105 In the case, class counsel had 
already administered a second round of direct disbursements to class 
members; the court found this to be evidence that further distributions 
100. Johnston, supra note 14, at 290.  
101. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 659–61. 
102. Id. at 666.  
103. Id. at 661.  
104. Id. at 661; Theodore H. Frank, Cy Pres Settlements, CLASS ACTION WATCH (Federalist 
Soc’y, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 2008, at 1, 21 (“[S]ometimes cy pres is less a matter of being punitive and 
more a matter of disguising the true cost of a settlement to the defendant to maximize the share of 
the actual recovery received by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. If the beneficiary is related to the 
defendant, or the defendant otherwise benefits from the payout, then the contingent attorneys’ fee 
can be exaggerated by claiming that the value to the class is equal to nominal value of the 
payment . . . .”). Some critics go so far as to say the entire doctrine is primarily a sham way to 
increase attorney’s fees. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: LESSONS FROM EIGHT YEARS OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 4 
(2013) (“In other words, cy pres is employed primarily to justify attorneys’ fees by inflating the size 
of the “award,” even though the award goes to charity, not the class members.” (emphasis added)). 
Such claims seem exaggerated as cy pres is often used to appropriate residual funds, and because 
courts have ways to reduce attorneys’ fees that appear excessive. See Wilber H. Boies & Latonia 
Haney Keith, Class Action Settlement Residue and Cy Pres Awards: Emerging Problems and 
Practical Solutions, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 267, 277 (2014) (“[C]ourts have procedures in place 
to evaluate the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, and if necessary, the power to decrease a requested 
fee award where there is ‘reason to believe that counsel has not met its responsibility to seek an 
award that adequately prioritizes direct benefit to the class.’” (internal citation omitted)).  
105. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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were feasible despite counsel’s conclusory allegations to the contrary.106 
The Eighth Circuit held that the “district court erred in finding that 
further distributions would be so ‘costly and difficult’ as to preclude a 
further distribution; that inquiry must be based primarily on whether ‘the 
amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions 
economically viable.’”107 The court invalidated the attorney’s fee award 
associated with the improper cy pres award.108 These cases illustrate the 
risk cy pres creates that attorneys may rush into making cy pres awards 
instead of working further to compensate class members. 
In In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation,109 objectors appealed the 
district court’s approval of a $35 million settlement of which only 
$3 million was to be distributed to class members, while about 
$14 million was to go to class counsel in attorneys’ fees and expenses 
and approximately $18.5 million, less administrative expenses, was 
destined for cy pres recipients.110 The objector asserted that the cy pres 
award was inappropriate because it would occur despite the fact that 
class members would still not be fully compensated for their losses.111 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed; it vacated the lower court’s 
approval and remanded for consideration of whether, in light of the large 
cy pres award and the fact that some class members would be 
undercompensated, the class was actually benefitted in this settlement.112 
On remand, the parties restructured the settlement to provide for further 
identification of, and direct payments to, class claimants.113 
2. Conflicts of Interest and Cy Pres Awards 
Another frequent critique of cy pres is that it creates conflicts of 
interest for the judges and class counsel that participate in the selection 
of cy pres recipients. One frequent argument is that by giving judges too 
106. Id. at 1064. 
107. Id. at 1065 (quoting ALI’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, § 3.07(a)). 
108. Id. at 1068. 
109. 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013). 
110. Id. at 169–70. 
111. Id. at 174–75 (noting objector’s argument that because one subclass of plaintiffs under the 
settlement would receive only a five dollar payout—regardless of the price they paid for their 
defective product—those class members would by design not be fully compensated for their losses). 
112. Id. at 170. 
113. See Opening Brief of Appellants Theodore H. Frank, Kathleen McNeal, and Alison Paul at 
42, Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., No. 14-1198 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2014) (citing Motion for Preliminary 
Approval of Third Amended Settlement, for Certification of Settlement Classes, and for Permission 
to Disseminate Class Notice, McDonough v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-0242-AB (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 18, 2013) (No. 847)). 
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much discretion in approving cy pres proposals, the doctrine creates an 
incentive for judges to approve charitable cy pres distributions based 
upon their own personal interests.114 This was the objection raised by 
petitioners in Nachshin v. AOL, LLC.115 Nachshin involved a class action 
by 66 million AOL subscribers for wrongfully inserting promotional 
messages into the footers of emails sent by AOL subscribers.116 The 
maximum recovery at trial was statutorily capped at the amount of the 
unjust enrichment AOL received from the footer advertisements: 
$2 million.117 As direct payments to class members would only be about 
three cents each, individualized distribution would be cost-prohibitive.118 
Instead, the parties agreed to a series of cy pres awards to various 
charities.119 The district court, at the parties’ request, suggested three 
charitable recipients to which the parties agreed.120 Objectors challenged 
the cy pres award to the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, on the 
grounds that it was improper because the judge’s husband sat on the 
board of the foundation.121 The court of appeals held it was not error for 
the judge to not recuse herself from this cy pres decision, but invalidated 
the cy pres awards on other grounds.122 Regardless of whether this was 
truly a conflict of interest for the particular judge in Nachshin, the 
appearance of bias has been used as an example showing the potential 
for abuse.123 
This concern about judicial conflicts of interest is furthered by the 
fact that cy pres doctrine has caused charities to essentially lobby class 
counsel and the court for awards of funds. Some judges have in fact 
acknowledged that they have been approached by charities for this 
114. Johnston, supra note 14, at 287; Wasserman, supra note 99, at 124–25; Yospe, supra note 
16, at 1028. 
115. 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). 
116. Id. at 1036.  
117. Id. at 1037. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. Id. at 1037–38.  
122. Id. at 1040, 1042 (invalidating cy pres awards because “none of the cy pres donations—
$25,000 each to the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, the Boys and Girls Clubs of Santa 
Monica and Los Angeles, and the Federal Judicial Center Foundation—ha[d] anything to do with 
the objectives of the underlying statutes on which Plaintiffs base[d] their claims” and because the 
awards also “[did] not account for the broad geographic distribution” of the nationwide class). 
123. See Wasserman, supra note 99, at 124–25 & nn.116 & 118 (citing Nachshin to illustrate the 
argument that cy pres creates an appearance of judicial impropriety). 
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purpose.124 Concerns raised over this effect are twofold. First, as 
charities lobby judges for cy pres funds, the concern is that judges will 
be persuaded to improperly award funds to one of these organizations, 
regardless of whether the funds truly represent the “next best use” for the 
particular case.125 Second, critics have argued that the interjection of 
third parties in this way fundamentally alters the bilateral adversarial 
structure of the civil justice system for class actions.126 The argument is 
that by putting judges in the position of acting as charitable grantors this 
new role “lie[s] well beyond the scope of the constitutionally ordained 
judicial function.”127 
Another major critique is that cy pres awards incentivize attorneys for 
either side to further their own personal interests, rather than the interests 
of the class members, in selecting cy pres recipients.128 One case that has 
been used as an example of such abuse is Diamond Chemical Co. v. 
Akzo Nobel Chemicals, B.V.,129 in which a court approved a cy pres 
award to George Washington Law School to use in funding their clinical 
programs, including programs designed to enforce antitrust law.130 This 
was heavily criticized because the cy pres recipient was recommended 
by class counsel, an alumnus of the law school, who was later praised by 
the law school for the donation and admitted to the school’s prestigious 
gift society as a result of the cy pres award to the school.131 
Another example of the conflicting interests between attorneys and 
the class members in selecting cy pres recipients is the Lane v. 
Facebook, Inc.132 settlement. While the parties reached a settlement in 
the amount of $9.5 million, $3 million was to be distributed to class 
counsel in costs and fees.133 The parties agreed to distribute the 
remaining funds though cy pres to a new foundation the parties created 
124. See ALI’s New Principles of Aggregate Litigation, supra note 61, at 200 (discussion by 
drafters of ALI’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation on the subjects considered in reformulating this 
newest edition; participants: Sam Issacharoff, Judge Carolyn Kuhl, Francis McGovern, and 
Stephanie Middleton; Moderator: John Beisner); Yospe, supra note 16, at 1035–36; Liptak, supra 
note 16. 
125. See Yospe, supra note 16, at 1036. 
126. Johnston, supra note 14, at 294. 
127. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 642. 
128. Id. at 650. 
129. 517 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D.D.C. 2007). 
130. Johnston, supra note 14, at 292–93; Yospe, supra note 16, at 1028. 
131. Johnston, supra note 14, at 292–93. 
132. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816–17 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 
(9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013). 
133. Id. at 817. 
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in the settlement called the Digital Trust Foundation (DTF), the purpose 
of which was to fund and sponsor programs educating individuals on 
“critical issues relating to protection of identity and personal 
information . . . from online threats.”134 Most notably, Facebook’s 
Director of Public Policy was to sit on the three-member board of 
directors.135 In a controversial decision, the Ninth Circuit approved this 
cy pres award, despite the presence of a representative from defendant’s 
company on the board and the nonexistent track record by which the 
court could judge the legitimacy of the organization.136 The dissenting 
opinion noted that DTF could be, and likely would be, controlled for the 
benefit of the defendant Facebook, as there was “nothing to stop 
Facebook and class counsel from managing the charity to serve their 
interests and pay salaries and consulting fees to persons they choose.”137 
Regardless of how often the cy pres mechanism is actually 
manipulated by attorneys and judges who structure awards for their own 
personal benefit, the appearance of impropriety has been established by 
the publicity of these controversial cases.138 Using these example cases, 
some scholars and judges question the doctrine in its entirety. Some 
courts have even expressed criticisms of the cy pres doctrine generally, 
questioning whether its use is ever appropriate. In SEC v. Bear, Stearns 
& Co.,139 which was not a class action but rather a SEC enforcement 
action, the court discussed the cy pres doctrine in the class action context 
in dealing with the analogous issue of how to distribute remaining 
funds.140 The court criticized other courts’ application of cy pres for 
straying too far from the concept of “next best use” and the nexus 
requirement.141 The court cautioned against the dangers in this practice 
and the appearance of impropriety on behalf of judges and counsel in 
approving cy pres awards to exaggerate attorney’s fee awards and 
further personal interests.142 
Some commentators and judges have raised constitutional concerns 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 829 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at 834 (“For all we know it will fund nothing but an ‘educational program’ amounting to 
an advertising campaign for Facebook. That would appear to satisfy the articles and bylaws, and 
Facebook, after all, together with class counsel and their nominees, will run it.”). 
138. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 24. 
139. 626 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
140. Id. at 411–17. 
141. Id. at 414–15. 
142. Id. at 415–16. 
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about the use of cy pres.143 Most notably, this argument has been raised 
by Professor Martin Redish, who argues that cy pres alters the structural 
incentives so fundamentally that it violates due process and separation of 
powers principles.144 In Klier v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc.145 the 
Fifth Circuit rejected a proposed settlement agreement concerning a 
proposed cy pres distribution, holding instead that the funds should be 
distributed to the already identifiable class members.146 In a strongly 
worded concurrence, Judge Edith Jones wrote a scathing critique of the 
cy pres and questioned the constitutionality of the doctrine on the same 
grounds.147 
These example cases illustrate real concerns raised by the selection 
and approval of cy pres distributions. Whether or not these examples are 
common in practice or outliers, the appearance of impropriety these 
cases create is at least optically problematic and has created significant 
backlash to cy pres doctrine. 
III. CY PRES APPLIED TO CLASS ACTION SUITS IN STATE 
COURT 
While much of the debate over the validity of cy pres as a mechanism 
for distributing class action funds has focused on the federal arena, many 
states have been finding working mechanisms for approaching cy pres. 
The Class Action Fairness Act148 (CAFA) was enacted in 2005 with the 
express purpose of shifting class actions from the state courts to the 
143. Recently the constitutionality of the cy pres remedy in class actions has come under attack 
on several grounds. See Redish et al., supra note 13, at 622–23; Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 
658 F.3d 468, 480–81 (5th Cir. 2011) (Jones, J., concurring). One criticism is that by compensating 
a third party, the underlying substantive law is enlarged in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. 
Redish et al., supra note 13, at 644–48. Another criticism is that introducing third parties as 
interested players in the compensatory structure of the class action runs counter to the bilateral 
structure of the legal system and renders disputes no longer a case or controversy under Article III. 
Id. at 642–44. Finally, the constitutionality is questioned on the grounds that by altering the 
incentives for judges and attorneys the procedure violates due process. Id. at 650–51. A direct 
rebuttal to these constitutional arguments is outside the scope of this Comment. However, other 
scholars have responded to—and rejected—these constitutional arguments. See generally Boies & 
Keith, supra note 104. 
144. See generally Redish et al., supra note 13; supra note 143 and accompanying text. But see 
generally Boies & Keith, supra note 104 (arguing that the constitutional objections to cy pres are 
unfounded).  
145. 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011). 
146. Id. at 475–77. 
147. Id. at 480–82 (Jones, J., concurring).  
148. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
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federal courts.149 CAFA operates by expanding federal diversity 
jurisdiction for class actions, and contains generous removal provisions 
for class actions filed in state court.150 Initial data from a 2008 Federal 
Judicial Center report does show that class action filings in federal 
courts are up since the enactment of CAFA.151 This data also notes an 
initial increase in diversity removals the year after CAFA, but that this 
trend in removals has been in decline since.152 
However, class actions still remain an important mechanism for 
dispute resolution in state courts.153 Plaintiffs continue to file class 
actions in state courts, and states that see these class action cases have 
been innovating new ways to approach the issue of residual fund 
distributions. Several states have codified rules governing the 
distribution of unclaimed funds in class action suits, expressly 
authorizing and structuring its use. Currently, sixteen states have 
adopted such measures.154 The unifying trend among these codified 
approaches to cy pres is a recognition by the states that legal aid 
foundations are legitimate and appropriate cy pres recipients.155 
Focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on Washington, this Part 
examines state approaches to cy pres. This Part begins by examining the 
approach adopted by Washington State. Next this Comment examines a 
149. Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of Class 
Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 KAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2010).  
150. Id.  
151. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS 
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf. 
152. Id. at 7.  
153. According to one informal study, class action filings in California state court exceeded 
filings in California federal court for both 2010 and 2011. Robert J. Herrington, The Numbers 
Game: Dukes and Concepcion, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 20, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/committees/classactions/articles/fall2012-1112-numbers-game-dukes-concepcion.html 
(noting that the number of state courts class action filings in California was 1,821 in 2010, and 
2,025 in 2011). A comprehensive study is currently underway in California by the California Office 
of Court Research in conjunction with the Hastings School of Law, however their data is currently 
available only through 2006. Hillary Hehman, Highlights from the Study of California Class Action 
Litigation, DATAPOINTS (Admin. Office of the Courts, Office of Court Research, S.F., Cal.), Nov. 
2009, at 1, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/datapoints-classactionlit.pdf; see also 
Gensler, supra note 149, at 811. 
154. As of May 2015, these states include: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. See infra notes 157, 199–216 and accompanying text. 
Additionally, at least one federal district court has adopted a local rule regarding the use of cy pres. 
See CONN. DIST. CT. LOCAL CIV. R. 23(b) 
155. See infra Part III.C.  
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recent class action settlement in Washington State—the prison rate 
disclosure case of Judd v. AT&T—to see how the Washington State 
approach operates in practice. Finally in this Part, this Comment 
examines the various other approaches in states that have codified cy 
pres. 
A. The Washington State Approach 
Washington was one of the first states to codify a specific rule on the 
distribution of residual funds in class action settlements.156 In 2006, the 
Washington State Supreme Court codified the use of cy pres for 
disbursing residual funds, mandating that at least twenty-five percent of 
residual funds be given to the Legal Foundation of Washington (LFW), 
an organization providing legal aid to low-income individuals in the 
State of Washington.157 The cy pres award funds are specifically to be 
used by the LFW “to support activities and programs that promote 
access to the civil justice system for low income residents of 
Washington State.”158 Beyond the mandatory twenty-five percent, 
Washington courts are free to distribute the remaining funds further to 
the LFW, or to causes that directly or indirectly further the substantive 
or procedural interests and objectives of the class members.159 The 
Drafters’ Comment to the 2006 amendment stated that the purpose of 
this proposed rule was to “codify and refine the judicially developed cy 
pres doctrine in a way that is consistent with its equitable purpose and 
which will serve the compelling interest in ensuring equal access to 
justice.”160 
156. Axel & Leen, supra note 34, at 24. 
157. WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f) Disposition of Residual Funds: 
(1) “Residual Funds” are funds that remain after the payment of all approved class member 
claims, expenses, litigation costs, attorneys’ fees, and other court-approved disbursements to 
implement the relief granted. Nothing in this rule is intended to limit the parties to a class 
action from suggesting, or the trial court from approving, a settlement that does not create 
residual funds. 
(2) Any order entering a judgment or approving a proposed compromise of a class action 
certified under this rule that establishes a process for identifying and compensating members of 
the class shall provide for the disbursement of residual funds. In matters where the claims 
process has been exhausted and residual funds remain, not less than twenty-five percent (25%) 
of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Legal Foundation of Washington to support 
activities and programs that promote access to the civil justice system for low income residents 
of Washington State. The court may disburse the balance of any residual funds beyond the 
minimum percentage to the Legal Foundation of Washington or to any other entity for 
purposes that have a direct or indirect relationship to the objectives of the underlying litigation 
or otherwise promote the substantive or procedural interests of members of the certified class. 
158. WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2). 
159. Id. 
160. 3A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, RULES PRACTICE, RULES FOR 
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B. Judd v. AT&T: A Washington Case Study 
A recent class action settlement in Washington illustrates the 
operation of Civil Rule 23(f) in practice, and demonstrates a creative 
approach by courts to fashion appropriate cy pres remedies. In Judd v. 
AT&T, plaintiffs brought a class action suit against defendant phone 
service providers for allegedly failing to disclose call rates on collect 
calls made from Washington prisons, as is required by law.161 The class 
was comprised of individuals who received collect calls from prison 
inmates, including spouses and family members of prisoners.162 The 
parties reached a $45 million settlement,163 and after notice and 
reimbursement of identified class members, the parties expected that 
more than $20 million in residual funds would remain for cy pres 
distribution.164 
In order to distribute cy pres awards in accordance with the 
requirements of Civil Rule 23(f), the court in Judd v. AT&T held a series 
of hearings to review, structure, and approve the cy pres awards. The 
court requested potential cy pres recipients to submit applications for cy 
pres awards from the residual settlement funds to the court, and 
scheduled a hearing to review and consider the applications for cy pres 
distributions.165 In the notice announcing the pending consideration of cy 
pres distributions, the court encouraged a wide range of applicants 
meeting the requirements of 23(f) to apply.166 In an attachment to the 
court’s order, Superior Court Judge Beth Andrus, sitting for the court in 
this case, specified that acceptable cy pres applicants would include: 
[E]ntities that provide, directly or indirectly, educational, 
financial, or other assistance to (i) prisoners or former prisoners 
in Washington State, (ii) the family members of prisoners or 
former prisoners in Washington State, or (iii) any legal aid or 
services organization (or their umbrella organizations, including 
the Legal Foundation of Washington) operating exclusively or 
nearly exclusively in Washington State which provides 
SUPERIOR COURT 533 (6th ed. 2013). 
161. Order Setting Hearing Schedule to Consider Requests for Cy Pres Awards at Ex. A, Judd v. 
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (King Cnty. Super. Ct., Wash. June 26, 2013). 
162. Id. 
163. Settlement Agreement, supra note 1.  
164. Order Setting Hearing Schedule to Consider Requests for Cy Pres Awards at Ex. A, Judd, 
No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (June 26, 2013). 
165. Id. at 1. 
166. Id.  
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educational, financial, or other services for prisoners or former 
prisoners in Washington State, or the family members of 
prisoners or former prisoners. However, any entity meeting the 
requirements of CR 23(f) should consider applying for an award. 
The ultimate decision regarding eligibility will be made by the 
Court.167 
Applications specified the objectives of the charitable applicants, the 
applicants’ proposed uses of the funds, and how those proposals related 
to the underlying objectives of the litigation.168 
In response to this request, the court received forty-nine applications 
for cy pres awards.169 In addition to seeking applications directly from 
possible cy pres recipients, both plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel 
were given an opportunity to review these applications, to file 
recommendations for cy pres recipients to the court, and to object to 
opposing counsel’s recommendations.170 
The court reviewed the forty-nine applications received in accordance 
with this notice, and held a hearing where oral argument was given on 
the distribution of the funds.171 The court then issued an initial order 
approving the disbursement of an estimated twenty-five percent of the 
residual funds ($5.5 million) to the LFW in accordance with the mandate 
in Civil Rule 23(f).172 The court also approved a disbursement of 
$1 million to the Endowment for Equal Justice.173 The Endowment for 
Equal Justice is a charitable endowment that provides civil legal aid 
funding for indigent residents of the State of Washington, and is 
partnered with the LFW, which makes annual grant distributions from 
the Endowment.174 
As for the remaining residual funds, the court ordered them 
167. Id. at Ex. A.  
168. See, e.g., Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual Funds, 
Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Aug. 5, 2013). 
169. Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations at 1, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
170. Order Setting Hearing Schedule to Consider Requests for Cy Pres Awards, Judd, No. 00-2-
17565-5 SEA (June 26, 2013). 
171. Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
172. Id. 
173. Id.  
174. The Endowment for Equal Justice, CAMPAIGN FOR EQUAL JUST., https://c4ej.org/how-it-
works/endowment-for-equal-justice/ (last visited May 3, 2015). The Endowment for Equal Justice is 
a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization “that helps secure justice for future generations by providing a 
stable, permanent funding source for civil legal aid.” Id.  
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distributed in cy pres awards to be administered through a grant 
program.175 In its application for cy pres funds, the LFW requested the 
court to permit it to “manage, grant and oversee all such funds in order 
to ensure that the purposes of this cy pres award are carried out in an 
innovative, collaborative and sustainable approach, with the objective of 
assisting incarcerated persons, those recently released from institutions, 
and their families for many years to come.”176 Because of its existing 
grant program structure, and its years of experience in overseeing the 
effective use of funds granted to non-profit legal services in the state, the 
LFW proposed to manage and oversee the funds to ensure they would be 
put to use to further the underlying cy pres goals in a transparent and 
effective way. 
The court ordered a further disbursement of funds to the LFW to 
distribute as grants, and provided a court-approved list of acceptable cy 
pres recipients consisting of “cy pres applicants that provide legal 
services.”177 The list included nineteen approved recipients, including 
several legal aid organizations, organizations advocating for the rights of 
prisoners, and clinical law programs at area law schools.178 The court 
further directed that: 
The money awarded under this paragraph, and any interest or 
other income from those funds, shall only be used to make 
awards in accordance with this paragraph. In making these 
awards the LFW should be guided by the objectives of this case 
and the interests of class members, especially prisoners and their 
spouses, parents, and children.179 
This provision of the order thus required the LFW to consider the 
relationship between the charity’s mission and the interests of class 
members in making these grant awards. The court reserved the right to 
175. Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
176. Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual Funds, supra note 
168, at 4.  
177. Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
178. The list of approved recipients included: “(1) ACLU; (2) Alliance of People with 
disAbilities [sic]; (3) Center for Justice; (4) Columbia Legal Services; (5) Disability Rights 
Washington; (6) Gonzaga U. Legal Assistance; (7) Innocence Project NW; (8) King County Bar 
Foundation; (9) King County Bar Institute; (10) Legal Voice; (11) Northwest Consumer Law 
Center; (12) Northwest Immigrant Rights Project; (13) Pierce County Center for Dispute 
Resolution; (14) Seattle Community Law Center; (15) TeamChild; (16) The Public Justice 
Foundation; (17) Unemployment Law Project; (18) UW School of Law Clinical Law Program; (19) 
Washington Defender Assoc./SU School of Law.” Id. at Ex. A.  
179. Id. at 1. 
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review these distributions,180 thereby providing some level of assurance 
that while a third party was to administer the distributions, they would 
be sure to manage the funds in a way that furthered the goals of the 
litigation. 
The court repeated this application process later on after attempts to 
locate class members progressed, and more funds were identified as 
residual. On March 27, 2014, the court held a second round of hearings 
to consider applicants for cy pres awards.181 The court made an 
additional award of funds to the LFW to use in accordance with the 
court’s prior order.182 In addition the court considered applications from 
twenty-one organizations, and made cy pres awards to eleven 
organizations, with specific instructions on the use of these funds, and 
made the awards subject to strict oversight and administration by the 
LFW.183 The final residual fund amounted to $22,993,074.46.184 The 
court made a final award to the LFW in January 2015 to issue cy pres 
grants to approved entities.185 In doing so the court again reiterated strict 
limits on the use of the funds, including that the funds be used to “help 
facilitate communications between inmates and their families”; help 
“improve treatment of prisoners, particularly those with mental and 
physical problems, to enhance their ability to maintain ties with 
families”; and help recently released prisoners reunite with families.186 
The court limited the geographic scope of the awards to Washington 
State, and limited the awards to those organizations with “verifiable 
track record[s].”187 
Today, the LFW still manages the AT&T cy pres award funds 
through a grant program. With the court’s order, and distribution of 
funds, the LFW set up the Prison & Reentry Grant Program.188 
“Recipients of Prison & Reentry funds are fourteen non-profit 
organizations providing social services and legal advocacy for 
180. Id. at 2.  
181. See Order for Additional Cy Pres Awards, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Apr. 23, 2014). 
182. See Order Granting Unopposed Motion Regarding Additional Cy Pres Distributions and 
Payment of Expenses, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Feb. 24, 2014). 
183. See Order for Additional Cy Pres Awards, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Apr. 23, 2014). 
184. See Final Order for Distribution, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Jan. 2, 2015). 
185. Id. at 1–2. 
186. Id. at 3. 
187. Id. 
188. Legal Foundation of Washington 2013 Report on Use of Cy Pres Funds at 1–2, Judd, 
No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Mar. 5, 2014); Annual Public Report 2013, LEGAL FOUND. OF WASH., 
http://www.legalfoundation.org/sites/legalfoundation/upload/filemanager/LFW-2013-Annual-
Report-to-post.pdf (last visited May 3, 2015). 
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incarcerated people, their families and those recently released from 
prison.”189 These organizations were selected for cy pres grants from the 
list of court-approved organizations by the Board of Trustees of the 
LFW.190 The Board looked to the criteria laid out by the court and 
counsel in approving these awards, ensuring that there was a link to the 
objectives of the case.191 
The LFW makes information available about the use of these funds 
on its website and in yearly reports.192 In accordance with the court’s cy 
pres award order,193 and the LFW’s grant structure,194 Prison & Reentry 
Grant Program grant recipients are required to provide LFW with yearly 
reports on their expenditures and cash flow, as well as narrative reports 
on how the funds were used, and how those expenditures furthered the 
goals of the program.195 The monitoring and oversight provided by the 
LFW ensures that the funds are actually used for their intended purpose 
and that unused funds are properly identified, accounted for, and 
appropriated.196 Thus, the LFW continues to monitor the use of the 
settlement funds to ensure that the cy pres funds are serving the 
189. Prison & Reentry Grants, LEGAL FOUND. OF WASH., http://www.legalfoundation.org/pages/ 
grants/grants_faq (last visited May 31, 2015). 
190. Legal Foundation of Washington 2013 Report on Use of Cy Pres Funds, supra note 188, at 
1; Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations at 1–2, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
191. Legal Foundation of Washington 2013 Report on Use of Cy Pres Funds, supra note 188, at 
1; Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations at 1–2, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013). 
192. Annual Public Report 2013, supra note 188.  
193. See Order for Cy Pres Award for the Legal Foundation of Washington and Legal Services 
Organizations at 2, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Sept. 25, 2013) (“The LFW shall condition any 
award made under this paragraph on the agreement of the recipient to provide an annual report to 
the LFW that includes information (1) stating the amount of funds received from the cy pres award 
for that year; (2) describing how those funds have been used; and (3) affirming those funds have 
been used for the purposes identified in its application for a cy pres award and complies with any 
condition set by the LFW or the Court. The LFW shall provide these reports to the Court and 
counsel not later than 60 days after the end of the calendar year and shall be provided for each year 
that the organization receives cy pres disbursements under this Order. After receiving these reports, 
the Court may set a hearing to further consider the status of the awards either on its own motion or a 
motion brought by counsel for the parties or the recipients of the cy pres awards.”). 
194. See Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual Funds, supra 
note 168, at 5–6.   
195. Id.  
196. Legal Foundation of Washington 2013 Report on Use of Cy Pres Funds, supra note 188, at 1 
(detailing grant monitoring measures and stating that “LFW is working with each organization to 
incorporate those unused funds into their budgets to ensure that all of the funds are accounted for”); 
see also Order for Additional Cy Pres Awards at 1–2, Judd, No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (Apr. 23, 2014) 
(specifying grant oversight procedures for subsequent cy pres awards). 
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underlying goals of the Judd litigation. 
This case represents a significant cy pres award not just because of 
the magnitude of the residual funds, and not just because funds were 
distributed to the LFW in accordance with Rule 23(f) for civil legal aid 
funding, but also because of the uniquely creative way that Judge 
Andrus awarded additional funds to the LFW to establish a cy pres grant 
program that assured the funds retained a nexus to the underlying 
litigation. In setting up this grant program, and selecting the LFW as the 
grant administrator, the court was able to divorce itself from any actual 
awarding of specific monetary amounts, while also ensuring that the 
funds received oversight. The LFW already had established procedures 
in place for monitoring legal aid grants as a part of the LFW’s IOLTA 
program, which includes yearly reporting requirements and a yearly full 
audit by a neutral third party.197 This approach allowed for all funds to 
go to either valid legal aid causes, or to qualified charities with close ties 
to the underlying merits of the litigation. 
C. Other State Approaches: A General Trend Towards Recognizing 
Legal Aid Organizations as Appropriate Cy Pres Recipients 
Several other states have adopted provisions into their civil rules on 
cy pres distributions in class actions. The general trend of these 
provisions, enacted in sixteen states thus far,198 has been towards 
recognizing that legal aid foundations can be appropriate cy pres 
recipients. There are four general patterns these various state approaches 
fall into. 
Several states have adopted an approach similar to Washington, 
wherein courts are directed to make a minimum award of the residual 
funds cy pres to a particular legal aid charity, usually the legal aid 
foundation that manages the state’s IOLTA funds. In addition to 
Washington, this approach has been adopted by Indiana,199 
197. See Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual Funds, supra 
note 168 (detailing the existing grant program structure in place at the LFW at the time the court 
was considering the intial cy pres awards in the Judd case). 
198. These states include: Washington, Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Illinois, South 
Dakota, Massachusetts, Maine, New Mexico, California, Tennessee, Kentucky, Montana, 
Louisiana, Connecticut, and Hawaii. 
199. IND. R. TRIAL P. 23(F) (“In matters where the claims process has been exhausted and 
residual funds remain, not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the residual funds shall be 
disbursed to the Indiana Bar Foundation to support the activities and programs of the Indiana Pro 
Bono Commission and its pro bono districts. The court may disburse the balance of any residual 
funds beyond the minimum percentage to the Indiana Bar Foundation or to any other entity for 
purposes that have a direct or indirect relationship to the objectives of the underlying litigation or 
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Pennsylvania,200 and Kentucky.201 These states all provide that a 
minimum percentage of residual funds go to their respective state’s bar 
foundation or foundation that manages the state’s IOLTA funds, to serve 
purposes of legal aid and access to justice, while allowing courts to 
make further distributions to these organizations if deemed 
appropriate.202 Montana takes a similar approach by mandating that at 
least fifty percent of residual funds be distributed cy pres to any access 
to justice organization.203 The Montana rule defines an “Access to 
Justice Organization” as “a Montana non-profit entity whose purpose is 
to support activities and programs that promote access to the Montana 
civil justice system.”204 
Another approach has been to limit the amount that may be 
distributed to legal aid charities. This approach has been adopted by 
Illinois, which provided in its civil rules that a maximum of fifty percent 
of cy pres awards can be awarded to a legal aid charity serving the 
public good.205 In doing so, this rule codifies that cy pres is an 
otherwise promote the substantive or procedural interests of members of the certified class.”). 
200. PA. R. CIV. P. 1716 (“Not less than fifty percent (50%) of residual funds in a given class 
action shall be disbursed to the Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyers Trust Account Board to support 
activities and programs which promote the delivery of civil legal assistance to the indigent in 
Pennsylvania by non-profit corporations . . . .”). 
201. KY. R. CIV. P. 23.05(6)(b) (“Any order entering a judgment or approving a proposed 
compromise of a class action certified under this rule that establishes a process for identifying and 
compensating members of the class shall provide for the disbursement of residual funds. In matters 
where the claims process has been exhausted and residual funds remain, not less than twenty-five 
percent (25%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed to the Civil Rule 23 Account maintained by 
the Kentucky IOLTA Fund Board of Trustees pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3.830(20). Such 
funds are to be allocated to the Kentucky Civil Legal Aid Organizations based upon the current 
poverty formula established by the Legal Services Corporation to support activities and programs 
that promote access to the civil justice system for low-income residents of Kentucky.”). 
202. PA. R. CIV. P. 1716; IND. R. TRIAL P. 23(F); WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
203. MONT. R. CIV. P. 23(i)(3) (“Any order entering a judgment or approving a proposed 
compromise of a class action certified under this rule that establishes a process for identifying and 
compensating members of the class shall provide for disbursement of residual funds. In matters 
where the claims process has been exhausted and residual funds remain, not less than fifty percent 
(50%) of the residual funds shall be disbursed to an Access to Justice Organization to support 
activities and programs that promote access to the Montana civil justice system. The court may 
disburse the balance of any residual funds beyond the minimum percentage to an Access to Justice 
Organization or to another non-profit entity for purposes that have a direct or indirect relationship to 
the objectives of the underlying litigation or otherwise promote the substantive or procedural 
interests of members of the certified class.” (emphasis added)). 
204. Id. at R. 23(i)(2).  
205. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-807(b) (“An order approving a proposed settlement of a class 
action . . . shall provide for the distribution of any residual funds to one or more eligible 
organizations, except that up to 50% of the residual funds may be distributed to one or more other 
nonprofit charitable organizations or other organizations that serve the public good if the court finds 
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appropriate use of residual class action funds.206 
A third approach has been to adopt a civil rule that codifies that cy 
pres is an appropriate use of residual class action funds, but does not 
prescribe a particular charitable recipient. States that have adopted this 
approach expressly permit the award of cy pres funds to legal aid 
charities but do not demand it. Several states have adopted a similar 
approach including: Massachusetts,207 New Mexico,208 California,209 
Tennessee,210 Hawaii,211 and Louisiana.212 
there is good cause to approve such a distribution as part of a settlement.”). 
206. Id. 
207. MASS. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“In matters where the claims process has been exhausted and 
residual funds remain, the residual funds shall be disbursed to one or more nonprofit organizations 
or foundations (which may include nonprofit organizations that provide legal services to low 
income persons) which support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated persons 
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying causes of action on which relief was 
based, or to the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee to support activities and programs that promote 
access to the civil justice system for low income residents of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.”). 
208. N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-023(G)(2) (“The court shall provide for the disbursement of 
residual funds, if any, to one or more of the following entities: (a) nonprofit organizations that 
support projects that benefit the class or similarly situated persons consistent with the goals of the 
underlying causes of action on which relief was based; (b) educational entities that provide training, 
teaching and legal services that further the goals of the underlying causes of action on which relief 
was based; (c) nonprofit organizations that provide legal services to low income persons; (d) the 
entity administering the IOLTA fund under Rule 24-109 NMRA, to support activities and programs 
that promote access to the civil justice system for low income residents of New Mexico”). 
209. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384 (providing for distribution of residual funds “to nonprofit 
organizations or foundations to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated 
persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying cause 
of action”). 
210. TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.08 (“A distribution of residual funds to a program or fund which serves 
the pro bono legal needs of Tennesseans including, but not limited to, the Tennessee Voluntary 
Fund for Indigent Civil Representation is permissible but not required.”). 
211. HAW. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“Unless otherwise required by governing law, it shall be within the 
discretion of the court to approve the timing and method of distribution of residual funds and to 
approve the recipient(s) of residual funds, as agreed to by the parties, including nonprofit tax 
exempt organizations eligible to receive assistance from the indigent legal assistance fund under 
HRS section 607-5.7 (or any successor provision) or the Hawai’i Justice Foundation, for distribution 
to one or more of such organizations.”). 
212. LA. SUP. CT. R. 43 (“Section 1. For purposes of this rule, ‘Cy Pres Funds’ shall refer to all 
funds that remain after the payment of all approved class member claims, expenses, litigation costs, 
attorneys’ fees and other court-approved disbursements to implement the relief granted. It shall not 
refer to any such remaining funds that are otherwise distributed by the parties through class 
settlement, including funds to be returned to one or more parties. Section 2. In matters where the 
claims process has been exhausted and Cy Pres Funds remain, such funds may be disbursed by the 
trial court to one or more non-profit or governmental entities which support projects that will benefit 
the class or similarly situated persons consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying 
causes of action on which relief was based, including the Louisiana Bar Foundation for use in its 
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One final approach taken among states codifying an approach to class 
action cy pres is to require the disbursement of funds to a particular legal 
aid charitable recipient, unless the court determines that another 
charitable organization better approximates the interests of the class 
members. Similar approaches have been adopted in state courts in 
Maine,213 South Dakota,214 and Connecticut.215 Interestingly, this state 
approach was recently adopted as a local civil rule in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Connecticut.216 
Each one of these state approaches recognizes that cy pres is a valid, 
or even preferred use of residual class action funds. In addition, each of 
these state approaches allows, or even requires cy pres awards be made 
to legal aid charities. Furthermore, many of these states have specified 
that the cy pres awards should be granted to a particular charity—their 
state’s IOLTA foundation legal aid charity. As will be explored in the 
next two Parts infra, these trends represent creative attempts to structure 
cy pres awards in ways that will make the awards more transparent and 
mission to support activities and programs that promote direct access to the justice system.” 
(emphasis added)). Interestingly, this statute also calls for mandatory reporting of all cy pres funds. 
Id. at R. 43(3). 
213. ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2) (“The parties may agree that residual funds be paid to an entity 
whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class. When it is not clear that 
there is such a recipient, unless otherwise required by governing law, the settlement agreement 
should provide that residual fees, if any, be paid to the Maine Bar Foundation to be distributed in 
the same manner as funds received from interest on lawyers trust accounts pursuant to M. Bar R. 
6(a)(2)-(5).”). 
214. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-2-57 (“Any order settling a class action lawsuit that results in the 
creation of a common fund for the benefit of the class shall provide for the distribution of any 
residual funds to the Commission on Equal Access to Our Courts. However, up to fifty percent of 
the residual funds may be distributed to one or more other nonprofit charitable organizations that 
serve the public good if the court finds there is good cause to approve such a distribution as part of 
the settlement.”). 
215. CONN. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 9-9(g)(2) (“Any order, judgment or approved settlement in a class 
action that establishes a process for identifying and compensating members of the class may 
designate the recipient or recipients of any such residual funds that may remain after the claims 
payment process has been completed. In the absence of such designation, the residual funds shall be 
disbursed to the organization administering the program for the use of interest on lawyers’ client 
funds pursuant to General Statutes § 51-81c for the purpose of funding those organizations that 
provide legal services for the poor in Connecticut.”).  
216. CONN. DIST. CT. LOCAL CIV. R. 23(b) (“Any order, judgment or approved settlement in a 
class action that establishes a process for identifying and compensating members of the class may 
designate the recipient(s) of any such residual funds that may remain after the claims payment 
process has been completed. In the absence of such designation, the residual funds shall be 
disbursed to the organization administering the program for the use of interest on lawyers’ client 
funds pursuant to § 51-81c of the General Statutes for the purpose of supporting its activities 
including, but not limited to, the funding of those organizations that provide legal services for the 
poor in Connecticut.” (emphasis added)).  
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consistent, guide—or even limit—the discretion of those involved in 
making the awards, and thereby provide for outcomes that better serve 
the interests of class members. 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF CY PRES—ALTERNATIVES TO CY PRES 
ARE UNSATISFACTORY 
When faced with the problem of residual funds from a class action 
settlement or award, for which further distribution to class members is 
impracticable or impossible, a cy pres distribution is the superior 
remedy. Of course, using the funds to directly compensate class 
members for their injuries will always provide the least controversial use 
of the funds,217 and if such a distribution directly to uncompensated class 
members is possible it should be made.218 However, once all individual 
class plaintiffs have been identified and compensated and further 
distributions are impossible, this Comment argues that the cy pres 
remedy, when appropriately applied, is the proper use of these remaining 
funds. This Part first examines the possible alternatives to using cy pres, 
and the drawbacks of each of these alternatives. This Part then concludes 
that cy pres is the superior solution for dealing with residual class action 
funds. 
A. Reversion 
One alternative to the use of cy pres for residual fund disbursements 
is reversion to the defendants.219 Under this method, any unclaimed 
funds will transfer back to the defendant. This is problematic because it 
results in a windfall to defendants.220 Defendants will be able to keep 
unlawfully obtained profits.221 Furthermore, this solution would 
undermine any deterrent effect that a judgment or settlement has on the 
defendant.222 
Judge Edith Jones in her concurring opinion in Klier v. Elf Atochem 
North America, Inc., argued that had the defendants not waived their 
right to a refund of undisbursed funds in that case, they would have been 
217. See supra Part II. 
218. ALI’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, § 3.07. 
219. Yospe, supra note 16, at 1042. 
220. Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed 
Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 749 (1987). 
221. Id.  
222. Id. 
 
                                                     
16 - Shiel.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:34 PM 
976 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:943 
entitled to the excess funds.223 Judge Jones argued that the “superior 
approach is to return leftover settlement funds to the defendant. This 
corrects the parties’ mutual mistake as to the amount required to satisfy 
class members’ claims . . . . [A] cy pres distribution . . . result[s] in 
charging the defendant an amount greater than the harm it bargained to 
settle.”224 This conclusion results from a fundamental error in 
reasoning—the funds represent the compensation due to the absent class 
members, and thus the remaining “excess” is a result of administrative 
difficulties in disbursing the funds, and not the result of an error in 
calculating damages.225 
Furthermore, a reversion remedy would undermine any deterrence 
effect of the litigation.226 “It is a basic principle of equity that 
wrongdoers should not profit from their wrongdoing . . . . Wrongdoers 
will be less likely to engage in future illegal acts if the incentive of 
unjust enrichment is eliminated.”227 Because reversion would allow 
defendants to keep unlawfully obtained profits, allowing a reversion 
remedy would undermine enforcement of the underlying substantive 
law.228 At least in the context of settlement agreements, there is a strong 
argument that defendants should not benefit from the reversion of funds 
because the “[d]efendants are never forced to agree to a settlement that 
overcompensates the plaintiffs.”229 In agreeing to a settlement, 
defendants have received a tangible benefit, namely a “release from 
liability with respect to the class members,” and the likelihood and cost 
of future litigation was likely factored into the settlement agreement.230 
223. 658 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2011). 
224. Id. at 482.  
225. Klier involved an appeal from a settlement agreement in a class action. Id. at 468. “The 
settlement agreement created three subclasses and allocated to each subclass a portion of the $41.4 
million settlement.” Id. at 472. The funds were to be used for one subclass to create a medical 
monitoring program, however $830,000 of the funds intended for this subclass were unclaimed. Id. 
at 473. The parties were in agreement that the distribution of these funds to individual class 
members was not economically feasible, and the court adopted a cy pres remedy. Id. The cy pres 
funds at issue thus did not represent an error in calculating the defendant’s liability, but rather 
represented the legitimate claims of unidentified class members.  
226. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 631. 
227. Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96 
YALE L.J. 1591, 1595 (1987). 
228. See DeJarlais, supra note 220, at 749 (“[T]o permit the return of the unclaimed funds, a 
portion of the illicit profits, would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is essential if 
adequate enforcement of the [law] is to be achieved . . . .” (quoting SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 
327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)). 
229. Yospe, supra note 16, at 1043. 
230. Id. (quoting In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 (N.D. Ga. 
2001)). 
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To return funds to the defendant because not every plaintiff could be 
located would represent an unjust enrichment to defendants who would 
be allowed to benefit from their violations of the law.231 
B. Pro Rata Distribution to Class Members 
Another possible alternative to cy pres is a pro-rata distribution of the 
residual funds to already compensated and identified class members.232 
This solution is also unsatisfactory because it overcompensates the 
identified plaintiffs and thus it results in a windfall to plaintiffs.233 
C. Escheat 
Another option discussed as an alternative to cy pres distributions is 
to allow the funds to escheat to the state.234 However, if it is unlikely that 
additional plaintiffs would be found, as would be the case in any 
appropriately used cy pres,235 this is likely not an effective use of the 
remaining funds.236 While this allows for the discouragement of ill-
gotten gains and serves deterrence goals, it is problematic in that there 
are no assurances that the money will be used for purposes that are in 
line with the underlying litigation.237 As such, to give the money, which 
is to be used for the benefit of class members, to a cause which could run 
counter to the interests of the class members would violate principles 
underlying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which mandate a duty on 
class counsel and the courts to ensure that the class action is being 
conducted in line with the interests of absent class members.238 
D. Refusal to Certify the Class 
One final proposed alternative to cy pres remedies, argued by Martin 
Redish and others, is that courts should refuse to certify a class action 
231. Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 768 
(2014).  
232. Id. at 1045. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 1046. 
235. See argument infra Parts IV–V. 
236. Yospe, supra note 16, at 1047–48. 
237. Barnett, supra note 227, at 1599.  
238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class.”); id. at R. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal would bind class members, the court may 
approve [a settlement] only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”). 
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when it is anticipated that a cy pres remedy would be necessary.239 The 
logic of this argument is that if it is likely that a majority of individual 
class members will not be able to be directly compensated by the class 
action litigation then the use of a class action would be unmanageable.240 
The problem with this reasoning is twofold. First, the problem of 
unclaimed residual funds is an issue even when there has been 
substantial compensation to a majority of class members but remaining 
absent class members cannot be located.241 In these cases, where a class 
was appropriately certified,242 the problem of what to do with the 
remaining funds persists. Due to the undesirability of the alternatives, cy 
pres remains the best use of these funds in these situations.243 
Another problem with the prospective suggestion to refuse to certify 
classes where cy pres is an anticipated remedy, is that this solution 
would deny many plaintiffs their day in court and access to justice. In 
cases where the claims of individual plaintiffs are small, the cost of 
bringing a lawsuit can greatly exceed the damages recoverable.244 The 
class action provides an equitable solution wherein these legitimate 
claims, which on their own would not be feasible to bring a lawsuit, 
become feasible when aggregated, and thus through the class action 
device are able to enforce the law and bring justice.245 In Hughes v. Kore 
of Indiana Enterprise, Inc., Judge Posner writing for the Seventh Circuit 
recognized the importance of the class action remedy for these small 
claims cases.246 Hughes involved a class action lawsuit against a 
company for failing to provide notice that their ATM would charge a 
transaction fee to users.247 Judge Posner noted that the alternative to a 
class action, individual lawsuits of damages of not more than $100, 
would “not be realistic.”248 “The smaller the stakes to each victim of 
unlawful conduct, the greater the economies of class action 
239. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 639. 
240. Id. 
241. Redish notes his proposed solution to cy pres would not help in this situation. Redish et al., 
supra note 13, at 665. 
242. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
243. See argument infra Part IV. 
244. See, e.g., Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that 
individual recoveries in the case would be only $100, and thus individual lawsuits—as opposed to a 
class action suit—would be impractical). 
245. See id. at 677. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 674.  
248. Id. at 675. 
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treatment.”249 
A deeper question is whether a class action should be permitted 
when the stakes, both individual and aggregate, in a class action 
are so small—so likely to be swamped by the expense of 
litigation—as they are in this case. But we don’t think smallness 
should be a bar. This is obvious when what is small is not the 
aggregate but the individual claim; indeed that’s the type of case 
in which class action treatment is most needful.250 
Refusing to certify a class action in the context of these so-called 
“negative value suits” would be tantamount to authorizing the 
defendants a free pass to violate the law when individual damages would 
be small.251 Furthermore, categorically disallowing these class actions 
from proceeding would run counter to the purposes of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23. One aim of class actions as guided by Rule 23, is “to 
provide a feasible means for asserting the rights of those who ‘would 
have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.’”252 
E. Cy Pres Presents the Best Option for These Funds 
As explained above, none of the alternatives to cy pres relief provide 
a workable solution to the problem of residual funds and funds that are 
impractical or impossible to distribute to individual class members. 
Alternatives to cy pres either create unjustifiable windfalls to one side, 
or run counter to the principles underlying the administration of justice 
and the underlying principles of class action litigation. However, when 
damages are given to a charity through cy pres, there are necessarily 
going to be third parties who benefit from the use of these funds.253 
Clearly, windfall is inevitable in a cy pres distribution of 
damages or settlement funds. The true question, then, is whether 
the undesirability of a windfall to third parties is outweighed by 
the positive effects of cy pres distribution . . . . Windfalls are 
hardly taboo in the law. Indeed, the traditional application of the 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 677. 
251. Cf. id. at 676 (noting that “[t]he smaller the stakes to each victim of unlawful conduct, the 
greater the economies of class action treatment and the likelier that the class members will receive 
some money rather than (without a class action) probably nothing, given the difficulty of interesting 
a lawyer in handling a suit for such modest . . . damages”).  
252. Buford v. H & R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345–46 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Jones 
v. H & R Block Tax Servs., 117 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985)). 
253. DeJarlais, supra note 220, at 741. 
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cy pres doctrine to frustrated testamentary intent may result in 
some windfall to beneficiaries who were not included in the 
testator’s original plan. Examples of accepted remedies that 
entail windfalls are injunctions, statutory minimum damages, 
liquidated or treble damages, punitive damages, [and] 
shareholder derivative suits . . . . The principle common to each 
of these areas is that some degree of windfall is a tolerable cost 
of effectuating the deterrent purposes of the applicable laws and 
ensuring recovery to victims who have actually been injured.254 
Although cy pres does provide a benefit to third parties, cy pres 
remains the superior solution for the distribution of these funds because 
it serves deterrence goals, ensures the viability of small damages actions, 
and uses the remaining funds to further the underlying goals of the 
litigation. 
V. IMPROVING CY PRES—LESSONS FROM WASHINGTON 
The main critiques of the cy pres doctrine stem from the improper use 
of the doctrine, not from inherent flaws in the doctrine itself. The 
problem of improper incentives255 can be effectively negated through 
good decision-making by judges and counsel, a clearer articulation of 
what qualifies as a valid cy pres recipient, and stronger procedural 
protections. By examining the Washington State approach to class action 
cy pres through the lens of the Judd v. AT&T case, it is clear that a 
statutory approach is the best solution moving forward as it will clarify 
the standards for approving an acceptable cy pres recipient and 
standardize procedures for selecting that recipient in a way that will 
reduce any appearance of impropriety. Cy pres has promise and value as 
an equitable solution to the problem of residual funds in appropriate 
cases; courts should not throw the baby out with the bath water. 
A. Improper Incentives Can Be Checked 
One of the main criticisms of cy pres doctrine in class actions is that it 
creates improper incentives for judges, attorneys, and charitable 
organizations to further their own interests rather than promote the 
interests of the absent class members.256 “Moreover, the specter of 
judges and outside entities dealing in the distribution and solicitation of 
254. Id. 
255. See supra Part II.C. 
256. See Redish et al., supra note 13; Yospe, supra note 16.  
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settlement money may create the appearance of impropriety.”257 
However, cy pres has been appropriately applied in many situations, and 
in states such as Washington, statutory mandates have effectively 
constrained discretion, and along with it, the illusion of improper 
incentives. 
The rule on cy pres in class actions adopted by Washington has been 
an effective solution to some of the key criticisms of the doctrine. The 
statutory solution adopted by Washington is effective in controlling 
incentives, and further exemplifies how courts can successfully 
implement cy pres doctrine properly in practice. 
First, the Washington approach only takes effect when residual funds 
are identified,258 thus ensuring that efforts are first taken to identify and 
compensate actual class members. This ensures that class counsel is not 
induced to seek cy pres without first confirming that further distribution 
of funds is impossible.259 This approach is consistent with the approach 
endorsed in the American Legal Institute’s (ALI) new Principles of 
Aggregate Litigation.260 The ALI proposed that a cy pres award is 
appropriate only if it is impossible or infeasible to distribute the funds to 
class members.261 “If individual class members can be identified through 
reasonable effort, and the distributions are sufficiently large to make 
individual distributions economically viable, settlement proceeds should 
be distributed directly to individual class members.”262 
Second, the Washington State approach curbs judicial discretion by 
introducing a mandatory disbursement of residual funds to the LFW.263 
Because the determination of the appropriate cy pres recipient is not 
being made by a judge, the judge avoids the appearance of impropriety 
and is prevented from making a distribution that does not further the 
interests of the class and or litigation, or one that is purely for self-
benefit. For example, the judge in Judd effectively avoided the 
appearance of impropriety by first implementing a rigorous review and 
approval of potential cy pres recipients, and second, by shifting the 
ultimate disbursement of the funds though an established grant program 
that was tied to the interests of the underlying litigation.264 
257. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). 
258. WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(1). 
259. ALI’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 60, § 3.07. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. § 3.07(a). 
263. WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2). 
264. See supra Part III.B.   
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Third, Washington Civil Rule 23(f) also gives a helpful articulation of 
what constitutes a valid use of cy pres awards. The Washington State 
approach represents a strong policy statement that legal aid charities are 
an appropriate recipient of cy pres distributions.265 The designated 
recipient of residual cy pres funds, the LFW, not only fits with the 
general access to justice principles underlying any class action 
litigation,266 thereby making it an appropriate cy pres recipient,267 it also 
has the benefit of being the foundation that administers Washington 
State’s IOLTA program.268 Because it administers the state’s IOLTA 
program, the LFW provides the benefit of an established grant program 
structure with independent third-party oversight.269 
B. Legal Aid Charities Can Be Appropriate Cy Pres Recipients 
Several courts have awarded cy pres distributions to legal aid 
charities.270 Furthermore many states have explicitly adopted rules either 
authorizing or mandating that cy pres funds go to legal aid charities.271 
Some courts and commenters have criticized this practice, arguing that 
while these recipients are surely worthy causes, they do not relate to the 
interests of the class members.272 Such arguments unhinge the doctrine 
of cy pres from its trust law origins, distorting the concept of “next best 
265. Id. (“[R]esidual funds shall be disbursed . . . to support activities and programs that promote 
access to the civil justice system for low income residents of Washington State.”). 
266. The mission statement of the Legal Foundation of Washington is: “The Legal Foundation of 
Washington is dedicated to equal justice for low-income persons. The Foundation funds programs 
and supports policies and initiatives which enable the poor and the most vulnerable to overcome 
barriers in the civil justice system.” Inside LFW, supra note 36.  
267. See infra Part VII.B–C. 
268. Interest On Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA), LEGAL FOUND. WASH., 
http://www.legalfoundation.org/pages/iolta (last visited May 31, 2015). 
269. See Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual Funds, supra 
note 168.  
270. “The absence of an obvious cause to support with the funds does not bar a charitable 
donation, however. In recent years, the doctrine appears to have become more flexible. . . . While 
the use of funds for purposes closely related to their origin is still the best cy pres application, the 
doctrine of cy pres and courts’ broad equitable powers now permit use of funds for other public 
interest purposes by . . . other public services organizations.” Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 
2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotations omitted); see also Eddings v. Health Net, Inc., 
No. CV 10-1744-JST (RZx), 2013 WL 169895 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013); Superior Beverage Co. v. 
Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill.1993).  
271. See supra Part III.C. 
272. See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The funding 
of legal services programs is a worthy pursuit. However, absent specific legislation, courts are left 
with unfettered discretion to direct the distribution of what can be large sums of money.”). 
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use” into the legal fiction of “indirect benefit.”273 However, under a 
proper articulation of the cy pres doctrine, a legal aid charity in an 
appropriate case, can accurately be deemed the “next best use” of the 
residual funds. 
As previously discussed, the cy pres remedy, as it originated in 
charitable trust law, seeks to save trusts that would otherwise fail by 
applying funds to the “next best use” that would effectuate the 
underlying goals of the settlor as closely as possible.274 In the class 
action context, cy pres has been interpreted by several courts, including 
the Ninth and First Circuits,275 to require that the recipient of the cy pres 
funds share a “driving nexus” with the interests of the plaintiff class for 
the indirect benefit of class members.276 “The purpose of the cy pres 
distribution is to ‘put the unclaimed fund to its next best compensation 
use, e.g., for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of the class.’”277 
The problem with the current leading articulation of this standard for 
cy pres—under either the indirect benefit or nexus articulation—is that it 
is based upon a legal fiction. As Judge Posner has acknowledged, 
“[t]here is no indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s giving the 
money to someone else. In such a case the ‘cy pres’ remedy . . . is purely 
putative.”278 However, Judge Posner has said that the mere putative 
nature of the cy pres remedy will not invalidate it.279 
Because this legal fiction has been reinforced as a legitimating 
purpose behind cy pres,280 and because the interests of absent class 
members will not be indirectly served by giving their money to a third 
273. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen a 
district court concludes that a cy pres distribution is appropriate after applying the foregoing 
rigorous standards, such a distribution must be ‘for the next best use . . . for indirect class benefit,’ 
and ‘for uses consistent with the nature of the underlying action and with the judicial function.’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010))). 
274. See supra Part I. 
275. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); In re Lupron 
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012). 
276. See supra Part I.B. 
277. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. at 414 (emphasis in original) (quoting Masters v. 
Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
278. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004). 
279. Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enters., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When there’s 
not even an indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s payment of damages, the ‘cy pres’ 
remedy . . . is purely punitive. But we said in Mirfasihi that the punitive character of the remedy 
would not invalidate it. Other courts, disagreeing, require the charity or other recipient to have an 
interest parallel to that of the class.” (internal citations omitted)). 
280. See generally, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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party,281 courts have struggled with the application of the cy pres 
principle when there is no existing charity that clearly approximates the 
interests of the class.282 In Jones v. National Distillers, the court 
struggled to find a charitable recipient that would indirectly benefit the 
class members in a stock market fraud class action.283 The court stated 
this difficulty in its opinion, noting that, “[c]y pres principles offer 
limited guidance here, however. While there are many worthy uses for 
$18,400.80, there is no obvious use for the money that provides a 
particular benefit to class members.”284 
When there is no clear charitable recipient with ties to the interests of 
class members, parties and courts have stretched this nexus requirement 
to try to fit over a charity with a less readily apparent tie to the class 
members.285 “Cy pres distributions imperfectly serve that purpose by 
substituting for that direct compensation an indirect benefit that is at best 
attenuated and at worse illusory.”286 Commenters have jumped on a few 
cases as examples of impropriety that were merely courts and parties 
going through this strained exercise.287 Martin Redish criticizes cases 
where there has been an attenuated nexus to class members’ interests: 
An even stronger illustration of the attenuated connection 
between the direct interests of the class members and the charity 
receiving the cy pres award is the federal district court decision 
in In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust 
Litigation. There the court in a compact disc advertised price 
antitrust litigation authorized a cy pres award to the National 
Guild of the Community School of the Arts. There was no way 
that the designation even arguably compensated injured victims, 
directly or indirectly, in any recognizable way . . . . 
Similarly . . . in Jones v. National Distillers, [] the court 
awarded a cy pres award from a securities fraud suit to a legal 
aid society because it was more related to the subject matter of 
the suit than would be “a dance performance or a zoo.” In none 
of these decisions did the charitable designation in any way 
constitute even a feeble attempt to indirectly compensate 
281. Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 784. 
282. See Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
283. Id. at 358.  
284. Id. 
285. See id. 
286. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013). 
287. See Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
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victims.288 
These criticisms stem from precisely the issue that compensating 
plaintiffs is not possible when the money is given to a third party. The cy 
pres principle in trust law was designed to appropriate funds to their 
“next best use”289 which does not necessarily indicate that an indirect 
benefit to the originally intended recipient is necessary, but rather allows 
for restructuring of the trust to “accomplish the general . . . purpose of 
the donor.”290 By analogy to the class action context, the funds that are 
impossible to distribute to absent class members should be restructured 
to further the underlying goals of the class action lawsuit.291 When 
conceived in this light, the “next best use” of residual funds in class 
action lawsuits should go to causes that further the goals of the 
underlying substantive law claims and underlying goals of the class 
action litigation. One such way to ensure that class action funds are 
going to their next best use is to disburse the funds cy pres to 
organizations that promote access to justice, which are necessarily 
implicated in any class action lawsuit: 
Class actions serve three essential purposes: (1) to facilitate 
judicial economy by the avoidance of multiple suits on the same 
subject matter . . . ; (2) to provide a feasible means for asserting 
the rights of those who “would have no realistic day in court if a 
class action were not available” . . . ; and (3) to deter 
inconsistent results, assuring a uniform, singular determination 
of rights and liabilities. “The class action is a powerful 
procedural device, offering enormous savings in time and 
judicial resources while opening up opportunities for both new 
forms of litigation and potential abuse by litigants.”292 
Access to justice is an important concern underlying class action 
288. Redish et al., supra note 13, at 636–37 (emphasis added). 
289. See supra Part I. 
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. b (1959) (“To what purposes the 
property may be applied. In the application of the cy pres doctrine, it is sometimes stated that the 
property must be applied to purposes as nearly as possible like those designated by the terms of the 
gift. To an increasing extent, however, the courts have recognized that in choosing among possible 
schemes the court is not necessarily required to adopt that scheme which is as nearly as possible like 
that designated by the terms of the gift. This is particularly true where the designated purpose 
becomes impossible or impracticable of accomplishment at some time subsequent to the creation of 
the trust. The court seeks to frame a scheme which on the whole is best suited to accomplish the 
general charitable purpose of the donor.” (emphasis in original)).  
291. See supra Part I for a definition of the cy pres standard. 
292. Buford v. H & R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345–46 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Jones 
v. H & R Block Tax Servs., 117 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).  
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litigation.293 Using cy pres funds to further access to justice programs, 
such as state legal aid foundations, would further the underlying goals of 
the class action litigation, and absent a closer substantive fit to the 
particular litigation, would fall within the purview of the funds’ 
legitimate “next best use.”294 
C. Judd v. AT&T Is an Example of Cy Pres Properly Used 
One clear example of cy pres properly used is the Judd v. AT&T case 
in Washington State. With a very large fund available for cy pres 
distributions295 the court was able to make reasoned and impartial 
determinations about which charities were appropriate, and was able to 
avoid any appearance of impropriety. 
The ultimate outcome was the application of cy pres at its best for 
three reasons. First, the Judge removed herself from making the actual 
individual grant determinations by approving charities as applicable in 
both credibility and in underlying support of the purposes of the case and 
gave the LFW the ability to approve grants to these charities with a 
mindfulness of the underlying purposes of the litigation.296 By removing 
herself from the individual award of cy pres funds, Judge Andrus was 
able to avoid the appearance of impropriety and allow for an unbiased 
application of cy pres. 
Second, charities that were interested in receiving cy pres funds were 
required to submit applications specifying the intended use of the funds 
and were required to articulate how they would use these funds to further 
the underlying purpose of the litigation.297 This creates transparency in 
the decision making process and ensures that cy pres is really being used 
for the “next best use” that furthers the objectives of the class action 
litigation. It also takes counsel out of the role of selecting a particular 
charitable cause, seen by many as a power susceptible to abuse,298 and 
makes the charities apply to specific cases that are linked to their 
underlying goals rather than operating as a general lobbying group for 
293. See id.  
294. Jones v. Nat’l Distillers, 56 F. Supp. 2d 355, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that the cy pres 
recipient, a legal aid charity, served the “somewhat analogous purpose of helping those needing 
legal assistance for various civil matters”); Boies & Keith, supra note 104, at 290–91. 
295. The fund was approximated at $20 million dollars. See Class Action Notice, Settlement 
Agreement at app. 2, Judd v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 00-2-17565-5 SEA (King Cnty. Super. Ct., 
Wash. Jan. 22, 2013). 
296. See supra Part III.B. 
297. Id. 
298. Yospe, supra note 16, at 1035. 
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any cy pres funds in any case. 
Third, Washington Rule 23(f) explicitly authorized a reputable and 
appropriate cy pres recipient: the LFW.299 Because this organization was 
designated by the state’s civil rules, the judge did not decide who 
received the funds. Thus, the Judge’s selection of this charity was not 
arbitrary or subject to concerns of bias or impropriety. Furthermore, the 
selection of a legal aid charity that will serve access to justice objectives 
furthers the underlying goals of the class action suit, and therefore 
arguably qualifies as an appropriate cy pres recipient.300 This legal aid 
charity in particular has the benefit of state oversight since it administers 
the state’s IOLTA fund and thus has a robust oversight structure,301 and 
because it has a strong track record,302 it is not subject to criticisms like 
those voiced about the newly created charity in the Lane v. Facebook 
case.303 
The particular structure of the grant program that was set up to 
administer the cy pres awards further ensured that the cy pres was 
applied in a transparent and effective manner to only qualified and 
appropriate cy pres recipients. The LFW laid out specific procedures to 
the court for the administration of a grant program, based on its exiting 
grant program structure for IOLTA funds.304 The LFW’s grant-making 
process is overseen by a nine-member Board of Trustees; three members 
are each appointed by the Washington State Supreme Court, the 
Governor, and the Washington State Bar Association.305 The LFW has a 
policy of only awarding grants to organizations that have “strong track 
record[s] of fiscal and programmatic integrity.”306 The grant recipients 
must provide regular fiscal and narrative reports to the LFW to allow the 
foundation to assess whether objectives are being met.307 
For the Judd v. AT&T case, the LFW proposed that their grant 
299. WASH. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2). 
300. See supra Part V.B. 
301. Interest On Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA), supra note 268. 
302. Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual Funds, supra note 
168 (“LFW has over 25 years of experience in granting and overseeing the effective use of funds to 
non-profit providers of legal services in Washington state. LFW has granted out over $160 million 
to nearly 50 organizations providing civil legal aid throughout our state by establishing and 
employing standards-based tools to assess program capability and program effectiveness.”). 
303. See supra Part II.C. 
304. See generally Application by Legal Foundation of Washington for Receipt of Residual 
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program would award cy pres funds to grant recipients with proven track 
records of serving and “assist[ing] incarcerated or detained people, their 
families, and those recently released from institutions.”308 The LFW also 
took measures to ensure impartiality in the grant-awarding process. The 
Foundation proposed creating a “Blue Ribbon Panel” of impartial 
experts to develop and facilitate the activities of the grant recipients, and 
the panel would not include current or past board members from 
recipient organizations.309 The ongoing oversight and annual reporting 
requirements ensure that the funds, once they are awarded, truly serve 
the interests of helping incarcerated persons and their families, and 
providing access to justice through legal aid.310 
D. Improving Class Action Cy Pres Outcomes 
States are providing innovative ways to address the cy pres process 
for residual class action funds. Washington Civil Rule 23(f) goes a long 
way towards establishing clearer standards as to when cy pres is 
appropriate and which cy pres recipients are acceptable, and effectively 
works to counter the risks of abuse by judges and counsel. While the 
mandated distribution to the Legal Foundation of Washington, required 
under Washington Civil Rule 23(f), is effective at addressing many of 
the key criticisms of cy pres, it does not fully address concerns over the 
appropriation of the remaining seventy-five percent. 
Other states address the remaining funds and apply a slightly different 
approach that is more in line with the doctrine’s “next best use” origins. 
For example, the Maine approach to cy pres allows for a court to award 
a cy pres distribution to a charity with a very close tie to furthering the 
interests of the class, but provides further that should no clear recipient 
be identified, the court is to distribute the funds to the Maine IOLTA 
Foundation, a charitable organization providing legal aid services.311 
This two-tiered mechanism allows a cy pres award to be distributed to a 
charity with a very close nexus approximating the interests of the 
substantive claims of the class if such an organization exists, thereby 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. Legal Foundation of Washington 2013 Report on Use of Cy Pres Funds, supra note 188. 
311. ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f)(2) (“The parties may agree that residual funds be paid to an entity 
whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class. When it is not clear that 
there is such a recipient, unless otherwise required by governing law, the settlement agreement 
should provide that residual fees, if any, be paid to the Maine Bar Foundation to be distributed in 
the same manner as funds received from interest on lawyers trust accounts pursuant to M. Bar R. 
6(a)(2)-(5).”). 
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ensuring that the funds go to the charity most-closely tied to the merits 
of the case if possible. If no such closely tied charity exists, then the rule 
requires the distribution of the residual funds to an approved legal aid 
foundation thereby ensuring that the principle of “next best use” is fully 
applied. 
Maine further justifies the distribution of cy pres award to a legal aid 
foundation by connecting the charity’s goals to the aims of the litigation. 
Distributing funds to the Maine IOLTA Foundation also serves the 
underlying goals of the litigation because of its legal aid and access to 
justice purposes.312 In the advisory notes to Maine Rule 23, the purposes 
behind this approach were noted: 
Specifying the selection of the Maine Bar Foundation in such 
circumstances has two advantages. First, it eliminates any 
possibility that a recipient is being chosen to benefit or garner 
credit for the defendant, for plaintiffs’ counsel, or for the court. 
Second, the principal aim of the Maine Bar Foundation—to 
support efforts to widen access to justice for those who cannot 
afford it—aligns with a basic aim of Rule 23 itself.313 
Other states should look to the approaches taken in states such as 
Maine and Washington when considering adopting a measure to address 
cy pres awards. Looking at these states for guidance, an effective 
approach would be to require residual funds to go to a state’s IOLTA 
legal aid foundation for grant distribution consistent with the merits and 
access to justice purposes of the class action litigation, unless the court 
finds that a different charitable organization exists “whose interests 
reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class.”314 
States should also consider the approach used by Judge Andrus in the 
Judd v. AT&T case and suggest awarding cy pres funds to their state 
legal aid foundation that manages the state’s IOLTA program to 
distribute to qualified cy pres recipients in the form of narrowly tailored 
grants with oversight and reporting requirements. This method shifts the 
ultimate decision to award specific sums of money away from the 
judiciary, and to a reputable third party with substantial oversight. Such 
methods would ensure that only those charities that are indeed the “next 
best use” receive cy pres funds and would eliminate concerns of 
charitable lobbying and remedy appearances of impropriety. 
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee is currently studying the 
312. Id.; see also ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory note. 
313. ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory note. 
314. ME. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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issue of cy pres.315 In a recent report the committee stated about cy pres: 
One of the reasons for disquiet about cy pres awards is the 
perception that at times they are made to recipients that will use 
the award for purposes that have little or no relation to the 
interests of the class. Awards to educational institutions favored 
by counsel or the court are an example. Could cy pres provisions 
in Rule 23 effectively direct that the award go to an entity that 
has interests closely aligned with class members’ interests?316 
As seen from the various state approaches to cy pres, a rule-based 
approach can be an effective way to tailor cy pres to its appropriate uses. 
As the Rules Committee considers whether to adopt an approach to cy 
pres, it should look to the state approaches for inspiration. 
CONCLUSION 
Cy pres doctrine has been harshly denounced by its critics who point 
to questionable cy pres awards as evidence of a “flawed” doctrine. 
However, these questionable cy pres awards are the result of poor 
decisions about how and when to select cy pres recipients, rather than 
evidence of inherent and unresolvable problems with the doctrine. In the 
absence of a clearly spelled out methodology for courts to follow in 
approving cy pres, the perception of impropriety will continue to 
dominate and cast a cloud over even the best uses of cy pres. Cy pres 
remedies remain superior to other methods for appropriating residual 
funds because they serve important deterrence goals and, when used 
properly, further the underlying merits of the class action litigation. 
Furthermore, cy pres remedies are a necessary mechanism to provide 
access to justice in cases with small individual harms. 
States have been innovating new approaches to cy pres that work to 
tailor the cy pres doctrine to achieve more consistent and appropriate 
outcomes. As seen in the case Judd v. AT&T, cy pres can be constrained 
and applied in ways that increase transparency, appropriately tailor 
awards to the “next best use,” and reduce the appearance of impropriety. 
Washington Civil Rule 23(f) goes a long way towards codifying a 
315. Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. on Rules, to Hon. Jeffrey H. 
Sutton, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Rules 9 (Dec. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2014.pdf (regarding 
Report of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules) [hereinafter Report of Rules Advisory Committee]; 
see also Andrew Trask, The Rules Advisory Committee Study Agenda—Cy Pres, CLASS ACTION 
COUNTERMEASURES (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.classactioncountermeasures.com/2015/01/articles/ 
certification/the-rules-advisory-committee-study-agenda-cy-pres/. 
316. Report of Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 315, at 9 (emphasis added).  
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workable approach to cy pres distributions in the class action context. 
Utilizing a two-tiered rule-based approach, as seen in other jurisdictions 
such as Maine, can ensure that funds are being used to approximate the 
interests of class members “as near as possible.” 
 
